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ABSTRACT
The Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) is often
referred to in Western press but still, little is known about
these uniformed zealots. This thesis is an attempt to show
that the IRGC is not a haphazard army but one that is striv-
ing to organize while, at the same time, attempting to deal
with Iran's internal security, as well as external threats.
Ayatollah Khomeini's death is certain to bring about the
eruption of further violence in Iran. The importance of the
revolutionary guards should not be underestimated in the en-
suing power struggle, since the Corps may eventually provide
future leadership for Iran.
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Iran's population mounted a true people's revolution when
life under the Shah began to sour, as he monopolized the state's
power in secular hands and excluded the religious leadership
from a voice in the government. Due in part to the Shah's re-
pressive policies, the intellectuals were driven underground
and began to use the religious mosque network as a means of
communication in their struggle against the regime. This was
the avenue to the people that was the least susceptible to
blockage by the central government.
Late in 1978, a general consensus had developed that the
extremism of the Shah's regime must be ended and parties from
all points of the political spectrum joined together to bring
about the demise of the Pahlavi Dynasty. The Shah's departure
from Iran on January 16, 1979, signalled their victory. How-
ever, the power that had once been concentrated in the hands
of a few secular leaders was once again controlled by a minor-
7
ity, this time the religious fundamentalists.
In the wake of his departure, the Shah left Prime Minister
Shahpour 3akhtiar to tend to his crumbling government. A key
factor in the ensuing power struggle between the Prime Minister
and the revolutionary movement was the armed forces. At first,

the army backed Bakhtiar' s government, and in a show of sup-
port at Lavizan barracks, home of the Imperial Guard, more
than 1,000 troops at morning prayer called on Allah to "keep
us alive to the last breath to fight for the Shah." On his
return to Iran after a 15 year exile, Ayatollah Khomeini
spoke of the new government in these terms: "The United
States and Britain have ordered the Army to keep Bakhtiar
in power." He gave thanks to the Air Force which had given
stronger indications than the other two services of joining
the revolution in large numbers. He encouraged the army to
follow that example and stated: "We want a very powerful
Array but not one which is trained by Americans and carries
4
out orders of U.S. military advisors."
Upon his return to Iran on February 1, 1979, Khomeini
announced Mehdi Bazargan, a member of the Iran Freedom Party,
as the provisional Prime Minister for the proposed Islamic
Republic. The military, however, provided a show of force,
which was a reminder to all that Bakhtiar was still Prime
Minister and had the support of the military. But the pen-
dulum of power was swinging rapidly to the side of the revo-
lutionaries. On February 11, 1979, in the face of mounting
opposition, Bakhtiar resigned and the army command, which
could have played a pivotal role in subsequent events,
declared its neutrality by ordering its men back to their
barracks. This move left Bakhtiar stripped of what little
authority he might have been able to retain. Once the

military withdrew, important government offices fell to the
revolutionaries. ^In the violence that followed, Imperial
Guards still loyal to the Shah, turned on Air Force per-
sonnel at Dowshan Air Base who had defected to the Khomeini
side. Tipping the balance in favor of the revolutionaries
in the battle that followed were two underground organiza-
tions, the Muslim Mujahidin-e Khalq and the communist
Fedayeen-e Khalq.
B. THE BAZARGAN GOVERNMENT
The immediate concern of the Bazargan government was to
restore law and order throughout Iran and this entailed call-
ing for the surrender of thousands of weapons which had been
"liberated" from government arsenals in the frenzy of the
revolution. Of greater concern to the effectiveness of the
fledgling government, was the shadowy Revolutionary Council
and the activities of the komitehs (Islamic revolutionary
committees) , whose armed members acted as marauding vigi-
lantes after the revolution. In Tehran alone, there were 14
komitehs, each with its own militia, operating out of mosques
and controlled by the Central Komiteh. Despite a pledge by
the Bazargan government that there would be no more firing
squads, the komitehs continued to order the executions of
numerous officials and military men from the Shah's regime.
Finally, in April 1979, Prime Minister Bazargan was able to
assert the authority of his Provisional Government by
10

announcing the koraitehs would be purged and 4,000 of their
militiamen would be merged into a national police force.
This was viewed as a victory for the Provisional Government
in its attempts to consolidate its power against the dis-
ruptive elements of the komitehs and abuses by their
militiamen.
This near-dictatorial rule by the komitehs, which, accord-
ing to Bazargan, were turning "day into night," caused the
Prime Minister to offer his resignation to the Ayatollah in
March 19 79. Although Khomeini rejected it and expressed
his full confidence in the Prime Minister, the secret
Revolutionary Council continued to function as a parallel
government. It was aided by armed detachments of revolu-
tionary guards, which, the Council admitted, were "not com-
pletely under the control of the Revolutionary Council."
Bazargan and his supporters wanted the revolutionary guards,
and the komitehs that controlled them, dissolved and the job
of law enforcement given back to the regular police. Showing
its support for the Provisional Government, the Mujahidin-e
Khalq urged that all power in Iran be given to the Prime
Minister. The organization issued a statement urging that
"No other authority should have the power to interfere in
the Government ' s affairs." Aware that this could cause a
potential rift, Ayatollah Khomeini stated: "We must join
hands against those who sow the seeds of discord and want
7
to drive us back to the previous situation." But, m
11

spite of this appeal for unity, power centers continued to
multiply in the absence of a hierarchy under the Ayatollah.
The komitehs, clergy, the army, and even the Council of
Experts, appointed to draft the new Constitution, developed
their own power centers as an even larger division developed
o
between the religious establishment and the secular opposition.
C. THE RISE OF THE FUNDAMENTALISTS
The downfall of Mehdi Bazargan's Provisional Revolutionary
Government came in the wake of the seizure of the American
Embassy by militant students on November 4, 1979. Upon the
acceptance of Bazargan's resignation, Ayatollah Khomeini
appointed the still secret Revolutionary Council to take
charge of the government, thus representing a shift in power
from the secular intellectuals to the fundamentalist clergy.
The Council was called upon to arrange a constitutional
referendum, the election of a constituent assembly and the
appointment of a president. Said Khomeini, "I charge you to
perform these duties, particularly those relating to the
cleansing of the government and the welfare of the poor
and the homeless in a completely revolutionary and decisive
manner.
"
The clergy obtained an even tighter grip on Iran when
the Assembly of Experts put the finishing touches on the
proposed Constitution. Controlled by Ayatollahs Montazeri
and Beheshti, the Assembly introduced a new office into the
12

Iranian government, that of Vilayat-e Faqih, or religious
guardian, which was a position tailor-made for Ayatollah
Khomeini, although his name was not mentioned. The reli-
gious guardian would have veto power over everything in
the country, act as the supreme authority over the armed
forces, and be more powerful than even the president of
the Republic. 10
However, not all of the clergy were in favor of these
measures. In Shi'ite Islam, there is a small council of
grand ayatollahs, each with his own following. Although
he was not the most senior of the religious men, Ayatollah
Khomeini was catapulted to the head of the six-man council
of grand ayatollahs by his unquestioned popularity. Of
great concern to some in the council were the strong arm
tactics used by Ayatollahs Beheshti and Montazeri, both
proteges of Khomeini, to assume power in the Islamic govern-
ment. This only served to heighten the existing feud between
Khomeini and some of the grand ayatollahs over the extent to
which the clergy should become involved in the governing of
the country. Ayatollah Shariat-Madari , the grand ayatollah
for Iran's 15 million Azerbaijani Turks, opposed basing the
Constitution on the religious guardian. Ayatollah Khoi, the
keeper of the holy shrine in Najaf, Iraq, and the two Ayatollahs
of Mashhad, Iran, were alarmed over the purges and brutalities
committed by the fundamentalists. In fact, violence erupted
when followers of the two Mashhad ayatollahs clashed with
13

revolutionary guards and fighting also broke out in Azerbaijan
when pro-Shariat-Madari followers protested the Islamic
Constituion.
D. BANI-SADR' S PRESIDENCY
In January 1980, after Ayatollah Khomeini "advised" the
clergy not to run for presidential office, thus dashing
Ayatollah Beheshti's hopes, Abolhassan Bani-Sadr was elected
with 75 percent of the popular vote. At the time of his
electoral victory,, it appeared that there had been a success-
ful bridge between a modern democratic state and the funda-
mentalist Islamic community. But, in fact, there was to be
no compromise between the two. A mixture of Islam and
nationalism would not be tolerated according to the Ayatollah
who said, "We want Islam, we do not want anything but Islam."
Supporters of the new president hoped that his election would
curb the excesses of the revolution and that he would reduce
the power of the clergy, the Revolutionary Council, the revo-
12lutionary guards, and the courts.
Bani-Sadr was immediately thrusted into conflict with
Ayatollah Beheshti and his clergy dominated Islamic Republican
Party (IRP) over the U.S. hostage issue. Prior to the presi-
dential election, Ayatollah Khomeini had given see-saw support
first to his Prime Minister and then to the militant students
holding the hostages by insisting there could be no compromise
or negotiation. Bani-Sadr, on the other hand, condemned the
14

Students following the Imam's Line as trying to act as a par-
allel government and also spoke against their use of force.
Gnce Bani-Sadr was elected, Khomeini appealed to the
populace to support the new president. The Ayatollah showed
his backing for the new government by granting Bani-Sadr
increased powers in dealing with the militant students.
He was elevated to the position of leader with executive
powers over the country's affairs from his office as head
of the Revolutionary Council. This move was an attempt by
the President to suppress the growth of independent power
centers, such as the militant students. Calling the students
"plotters," Bani-Sadr, in his new capacity as chairman of the
Revolutionary Council, barred them from automatic access to
radio and television, insisting that they rely instead on
the nation's judicial process.
A blow was dealt, not only to a quick solution to the
hostage issue, but also to Bani-Sadr's attempts at national
unity, when Ayatollah Beheshti, speaking for Khomeini, an-
nounced that the fate of the hostages would be decided by
the Majlis (Parliament), whose election was still 10 weeks
away. This was in line with Beheshti' s attempts to reduce
the new President's power and cause him to be nothing more
than a figurehead. This decision signalled the setback for
Bani-Sadr, who had wanted to transfer the hostages to govern-




The rift became greater when the IRP, which was demanding
spy trials for the U.S. hostages, won control in the Majlis.
Sani-Sadr was hesitant to proceed with such trials, as he
felt that Iran should be satisfied with an apology from the
United States for its former policies. Fearing further
division, Khomeini warned that the country was in a state
of "chaos" and that the President and the IRP should resolve
their differences over the hostage issue and the selection
of a new Prime Minister, the next bone of contention in the
continuing power struggle.
The IRP itself was not without its internal conflicts
but common causes such as its opposition to U.S. imperialism,
the struggle against the Shah, and loyalty to Khomeini en-
abled it to form a formidable block against opposition that
arose. The IRP also used revolutionary guards, the hiz-
bollahis (street mobs) , and the komitehs to increase its
political base. Although the Islamic Republican Party
denied that the hizbollahis were a part of its activities,
the street mobs consistently received the support of the
pasdars (revolutionary guards) , who were undeniably associ-
ated with the IRP as a whole. When hizbollahi mobs attacked
the headquarters of the IRP's political opponents, the
areas which were captured were turned over to the IRGC,
which, in some cases, did not return them to their original
owners. This happened in the takeover of the National Front
offices and in the "cleansing" campaigns against Mujahidin
16

offices, homes and rallies. They were attacked jointly by
hizbollahis and pasdars and fighting became so intense, that
3ani-Sadr ordered round-the-clock protection on the home of
a well-known Mujahidin family.
The President also tried to rein in the IRGC after his
appointment by Khomeini as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces. 3ecause they were not as well trained, less heavily
armed and not as disciplined as the regular army, the
Pasdaran posed more of a potential political threat, due to
their revolutionary cohesion. In his capacity as Commander-
in-Chief, Bani-Sadr called on the IRGC to remain out of the
political power struggle. This was difficult since the
fundamentalists were attempting to neutralize the army and
17
cement their control over the IRGC. In one plot to under-
mine the President's authority, a member of the Central
Committee of the IRP, Hassan Ayat , was quoted in a taped
conversation as planning to force Bani-Sadr' s resignation
by political means or by force, if necessary. If need be,
he suggested that the fundamentalists start training an
"army of 20 million" under the cover of the Revolutionary
Guards Corps.
In an attempt to boost support for the moderate President,
the Khomeini family opened an all-out campaign to help con-
solidate Bani-Sadr's authority. The Ayatollah publically
condemned the street violence that had provided Ayatollah
Beheshti with ammunition for his fight against Bani-Sadr's
17

power struggle. Khomeini's son and son-in-law ridiculed the
street mobs and warned that Iran must begin to seek long range
stability. Said his son-in-law, "God is with 3ani-Sadr. One
must confirm him... those who wish to crush Bani-Sadr and his
like must know that society will crush them." Although this
was the strongest support the President had received thus far,
the Ayatollah did not provide sufficient backing throughout
Bani-Sadr's presidency and preferred, instead, to stay aloof
from the power struggle, intervening only on rare occasions.
Because of this, Bani-Sadr xvas unable to convert his land-
19
slide presidential victory into real political power.
E. BANI-SADR'S DECLINE
The power struggle between Bani-Sadr and the fundamen-
talists came to a head over the choice of a new Prime Minister.
Although, according to the Constitution, Iran's President was
next in rank to Ayatollah Khomeini, in fact, Bani-Sadr could
do very little without the approval of the Majlis, in which
the IRP had won a majority of the seats. Earlier, before the
Majlis was scheduled to be inaugurated on May 28, the President
had tried to appoint a new Prime Minister but those nominated
turned down the position or were vetoed by the IRP hard-liners
in the Revolutionary Council. The former Navy chief and presi-
dential hopeful, Rear Admiral Ahmad Madani, rejected the offer
after asking for a reduced role of the clergy in the government
administration, something Bani-Sadr could not accomplish.
18

Others were reluctant to accept the job since the new Prime
Minister would have to resign only weeks after accepting his
position and be forced to seek two separate votes from the
new parliament in order to be reinstated in the office.
In a last ditch effort to avoid appointing a nominee from
the IRP, Bani-Sadr wrote a note to Khomeini in which he said
that the Ayatollah's son, Admad, was best qualified to become
Prime Minister. Khomeini's reply was to the point, "My son
Ahmad is a servant of the nation and can best serve the
nation if he is free.""
A further blow to the confidence of Bani-Sadr' s govern-
ment was the election of a fundamentalist hard-liner,
Hoj atollislam Hashemi Rafsanjani, as Speaker of the Majlis
by a healthy majority of 146 out of 196 members presiding.
In addition, another fundamentalist, Muhammad Ali Rajai,
was selected as Prime Minister. Also, most of the ministries
were either controlled by the clergy's IR? or, in the in-
stances where Bani-Sadr' s supporters were in figure-head
positions, they were attacked by the fundamentalists from
within their own ministries. Over a month's time, four
political parties were forced to close their offices and
the nationalists and communists were forced to take their
struggle underground. The IRP became the one party able to
function openly and there was little chance that Bani-Sadr
could have reversed this trend.
19

As Ayatollah Khomeini's health improved in mid-1980, he
began to criticize the moderate government saying nothing had
changed and the same bureaucrats who had misruled Iran during
the Shah's time were continuing to work for the nev; govern-
ment. He insisted that education be made Islamic and placed
an emphasis on the "revolutionary institutions of government."
The fact that the Ayatollah continuously wavered back and
forth between his support for the clergy and the President,
22had the effect of backing the clergy. The Ayatollah' s un-
happiness with Bani-Sadr increased when the President sent a
letter to Khomeini calling for the resignation of Prime
Minister Rajai's government. He also stated, "The presence
of the current government is more disasterous than a war,"
and he complained that the Ayatollah had disregarded his
warnings. He emphasized that instead of being able to
solve the hostage issue "from a strong position, we will
have to solve it from a weak position and one of surrender."
He also drew a comparison between Britain under Neville
Chamberlain and Rajai's government and claimed that the
present government was waging a war of attrition against
his presidency. He went on to accuse the fundamentalists
of being responsible for weakening the armed forces which
he had hoped to strengthen. He appealed to Khomeini for a
free hand in dealing with the armed forces since he felt
they must follow a "unified command." Bani-Sadr stated,
"If I have not done anything else, at least I have taken the
20

disorganized military, one that was disappointed and full of
chaos... and today am fighting with them on all fronts."
Since the outbreak of the Gulf T.7ar in September 1980, Khomeini
had entrusted Bani-Sadr with the conduct of the war, which had
increased his popularity. This letter was leaked to the press
23
and only served to escalate the already existing tensions.
After the publication of the letter it appeared that
Khomeini had taken some of the President's words to heart
when he announced on November 6, 1980, that "Those who do
not profess military knowledge must not interfere in military
affairs. It is like a colonel coming to us and wanting to
tell us what the Islamic regulations are." Foreign corre-
spondents to the war fronts were able to obtain confirmation
from officers that the influence of the clergy had been re-
duced and that coordination between the army and the IRGC
and improved. However, this backing of the President was
short-lived, when on November 19, Bani-Sadr bitterly attacked
his fundamentalist opponents in a speech and gave the IRP a
renewed opportunity to continue its campaign against his
24
moderate government.
The outbreak of the Iran/Iraq war offered the fundamen-
talists more ammunition in their fight against the moderates.
The early war effort served to invigorate the religious in-
fluence when the army crumbled under surprise Iraqi attacks
and the only effective resistance came from the revolution-




as a minimum to save it from complete disgrace. After his
appointment as Commander-in-Chief, Bani-Sadr grasped at this
"new lease on political life" and began building links with
the military and spending a great deal of time on the war
fronts. After a July 1980 attempted military coup, the army
was heavily purged, allowing the clergy-backed revolutionary
guards to assume key military commands. During the third
week in July, the army command announced that 100 soldiers a
day would be purged, thus putting a sizable dent in Bani-Sadr'
s
popularity base. This, coupled with legislation calling for
equipping the revolutionary guards with heavy weapons and giv-
ing the Corps the pick of draftees, gave the IRP the edge in
the political struggle. The fundamentalists began attacking
the President publically in the Friday prayer sessions, when
Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, a proposed successor to
Khomeini, demanded to know why the army had not gone on the
27
offensive in the war with Iraq." Bani-Sadr had sided with
the army and defended it as "a victim of revolutionary fervor,"
thus tying his fate with that of the army's. His plan to
bring back officers who had formerly served the Shah only
helped to weaken his revolutionary position. The idea that
"ability is more important than loyalty" was a source of
deep concern to the revolutionary and religious leaders who
could foresee a victorious but disloyal army as eventually
2 8turning against the revolution.
22

F. THE END OF BANI-SADR
The fundamentalists became bolder in their attacks against
the President and called for his dismissal when he was accused
of acting unconstitutionally after his supporters used force
in a March 6, 1981 presidential rally in Tehran. This use of
violent tactics lost Bani-Sadr the advantage he had once held
against the radicals. Stripped of his title of Commander-in-
Chief by the Ayatollah in early June, the President was faced
with the prospect of a trial for "defying" Khomeini's orders
and refusing to sign bills passed by the Majlis, a violation
of the Constitution. A short time later, on 22 June 1981,
Bani-Sadr stepped down as the first President of the Islamic
Republic and, branded as a "counterrevolutionary" by his
former mentor, Ayatollah Khomeini, went into hiding. From
there, the former President accused the clergy of meddling
in military affairs and weakening the war effort by conspir-
ing against him. He urged the military to continue to fight
against Iraq without allowing "traitorous hands to stab you
in the back." Eventually, he escaped to Paris with Massoud
Rajavi, the leader of the Mujahidin-e Khalq, and formed a
National Council of Resistance with the Kurds and other
29
ethnic minorities opposed to the regime.
The country was now firmly in the hands of the fundamen-
talists but their control was not to go unchallenged. The
Mujahidin-e Khalq began a reign of terror in which countless
IRP members, including the head of the party, Ayatollah
23

Beheshti, were killed. In spite of the opposition, the
clergy's candidate for President, Koj atolislam Ali Khamenei,
was successful in the October 2, 1981 elections, winning 95
percent of the vote. Unlike his predecessor, Khamenei was
not granted the power of Commander-in-Chief and, instead,
that position was delegated to the head of the Joint Staff,
General Qassem Ali Zahirnejad.
G. THOUGHTS ON IRAN'S FUTURE
"If Khomeini were to die tomorrow, Iran would split apart.,.
It would be the next Lebanon." Former President Bani-Sadr
Ayatollah Khomeini has been the cohesive force keeping
the Islamic Republic together since its inception and with
his death, the monopoly enjoyed so far by the fundamentalists
will most likely end. Because of Khomeini's sanction, the
IRP has managed to maintain its authority, and his continued
blessing of the fundamentalist party, for the time being,
secures their popularity with the lower classes. It will be
32difficult to ensure this popularity once he is gone.
The IRP itself is split between the Maktabi and the
Hodjatieh clerics and when Khomeini dies the power struggle
between these two groups is certain to surface. Underground
organizations, such as the Mujahidin-e Khalq, will be anxious
to do battle with their enemies, the fundamentalists, and the
Kurds and other ethnic minorities will press harder in their
struggle for autonomy. The civil war which is likely to
ensue will leave a power vacuum that must be filled quickly
24

by a person or persons with an organized, powerful, backing.
The army, which would have been the most probable candidate
to do this, is split by ethnic factions and weakened by numer-
ous purges. Since the April 1980 attempt by the United States
to rescue the hostages, suspicions about the loyalty of the
33
military have bounded out of proportion. The one cohesive
force that could emerge victorious from a civil war is the
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. Over the last three
years, it has evolved from a ragtag force of glorified body
guards and policemen into an organized and highly motivated
army. It is not inconceivable that an Iranian Cromwell or
Bonaparte could rise from the ranks of the revolutionary guards
and take up the position of leader in the midst of the chaos
which is highly probable at Khomeini's death. Western writers
have tended to gloss over the importance of the IRGC, prefer-
ing, instead, to offer the army as the answer to fill any
future power vacuum. The revolutionary guards have been
dismissed as crazed zealots or canon fodder provided by the
religious fundamentalists. This is an attempt to shed light
on this often ignored organization from whose ranks might one
day come a future leader of Iran.
25
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II. ORGANIZATION OF THE IRGC
A. ORIGINS OF THE CORPS
"The aim of the Revolution Guard Corps is to protect and
preserve the Islamic Revolution. Unlike the army and the
various military and regular forces in the world, whose
aim is to preserve states, national soil and sovereignty,
the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps is in charge of
safeguarding the Revolution and its gains. M ^
-Mohsen Reza'i, Commander
IRGC
The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) traces its
origins to the local Islamic komitehs (committees), each with
its own militia, which sprang up throughout Iran during the
revolution and faced the Shah's regime in a final "showdown."
The collapse of the Shah's government and Prime Minister
Bakhtiar's subsequent resignation on 11 February 1979, did
not bring an end to Iran's violence and chaos. Thousands of
gun-toting revolutionaries took to the streets and, in an
attempt to bring about some semblance of order, the Revolu-
tionary Government announced that only those deemed "mentally
and physically suitable" would be allowed to carry weapons.
On 14 February, Ayatollah Khomeini called for the surrender
of an estimated 300,000 guns which had been "liberated" from
army and police arsenals during the revolution, and he also
2
warned that keeping the guns were forbidden under Islam.
In order to bring about relative calm in Tehran, armed
volunteers, paying for their equipment and using their own
28

cars, tock to patrolling the streets and setting up roadblocks
in order to perform searches and seizures. They were issued
identity cards by a committee in each of the mosques and any
*
items which they confiscated were turned over to the mosque.
Dressed in haphazard uniforms and brandishing high-powered
weapons, these ardent followers of the Ayatollah provided the
only government that most people saw on a daily basis. Termed
an "irregular" militia, they executed several general officers
condemned to death, directed traffic, and guarded military
bases and homes of the "criminals of the former regime."
Threatening to resign, Prime Minister Bazargan stated, "They
persecute people, they arrest people, they issue orders ,» they
4
oppose us, they are against our appointment."
B. THE KOMITEHS
In the aftermath of the revolution, a typical komiteh passed
sentences at secret trials and determined the time of death for
those found guilty, set up rehabilitation programs for prosti-
tutes, banned all alcohol, and ordered all liquor stores des-
troyed. Operating out of local mosques, the komitehs were
described as "the Justice Ministry, the law court, the police
and gendarmerie-anything you can imagine." The committees
in the provinces received their orders from the Central Com-
mittee in Tehran, which acted as the executive arm of the
Revolutionary Council. The komiteh of Abadan, for instance,
was typical of most committees and was composed of 13 members




One komiteh, named the "Khomeini" Committee, conducted
property surveys of those people connected with the former
regime. Property was seized by order of the committee, and
once inventoried, would be returned only if it could be
proven that the items were not acquired illegally or by
"non- Islamic" means. Ayatollah Khomeini declared that the
property would be confiscated for the benefit of the "dis-
possessed classes." These inventory operations took place
at night and were carried out by inventory commando groups,
7
consisting of to 9 members, including a photographer.
The komitehs became so powerful and their attacks on the
populace so plentiful, that the Chief Prosecutor of the
Islamic Revolut ionary Courts placed a ban on local revolu-
tionaries, who were acting under the direction of the komitehs,
from entering private homes without special authorization. In
fact, the local komitehs were also required to obtain special
permission from the Chief Prosecutor's office before allowing
their members to conduct raids on homes. In addition, the
Interior Ministry called on the people to inform the revolu-
o
tionary committees of anyone who "imposed" on them.
The National Front, the largest political party in Iran
prior to the revolution, called for a creation of a National
Guard and for measures to bring the committees under state
control. It was hoped that the creation of a National Guard
would overcome the problem of whether or not the Iranian army
had been properly purged of supporters of the Shah. It also
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came as a result of bandits terrorizing roads in the provinces
and Tehran, and the lack of cohesion between the revolutionary
9forces. Elements of the Mujahidin and the Fedayeen also
brought pressure on the 3azargan government to replace the
security forces of the old regime with a "spirited" guardian
corps.
Mohammad Riza Mahdavi-Kani was appointed Director of all
of the komitehs in an attempt at centralizing control over
the activities of the committees throughout the country and
this position was attached to the Prime Minister's office.
In March 1979, Deputy Prime Minister Entezam stated, "These
committees have taken the law into their hands and were un-
dermining the authority of the provisional government and
damaging the revolutionary spirit." He went on to say that
an Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps or Pasdaran (guardians)
would be set up as a "temporary" measure until the police
and the gendarmerie were able to take over those functions
again. The Ayatollah also ordered a sharp reduction in the
activities of his armed followers who had already assumed the
roles of both police force and militia after the revolution.
In addition, in a move that could be interpreted as an
attempt to dilute the power of these armed followers, it
was decided to form two government sponsored units. One
would be a temporary auxiliary police force, known as the
Revolutionary Watchmen who would serve as police until reg-
ular units returned, and the second unit would be a permanent
12
auxiliary to the army.
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C. A SEPARATE ENTITY
Ayatollah Khomeini issued an order for the establishment
of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and it was approved
by the Revolutionary Council on 22 April 1979. 13 He called
for the formation of a special armed force which would "pro-
tect the Islamic Revolution" and be responsible only to the
Revolutionary Council. Now, the Pasdarans , instead of being
integrated into the police force and armv as originally
planned, were to become a separate entity. This action was
prompted by the assassinations of Ayatollah Morteza Motahari,
the supposed Chairman of the Revolutionary Council, and
General Mohammad Vali Oarani, a former Chief of Staff. The
revolutionary guards were to be a "different, independent
military force," whose allegiance would be to the Islamic
fundamentalists and not the provisional government, thereby
increasing the tension between the parallel governments.
Later, President Bani-Sadr, just a few days prior to his
exile, would describe the Corps in the following manner:
In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the revolution guards
corps should as a matter of principle take upon itself the
tasks of consolidating, organizing and mobilizing the masses
for the implementation of the public duty. According to
this assumption, the corps will be an armed organization
possessing revolutionary criteria, and the revolutionary
awareness and maturity of its members will be the basic
condition for accepting the responsibility of acting as
a guard. Those who meet these conditions will, through
their awareness of (the responsibility attached to) carry-




In my view, a revolution guard is a popular and re-
volutionary individual who, while possessing power,
is nevertheless in possession of Islamic magnanimity;
he regulates his relations with the subjects of the
Islamic Republic, even those who might be opposed to
him politically, on the basis of Islamic mercy and
kindness, although he acts steadfastly and decisively
against the aggressive enemy. The Islamic revolution
guards should be composed of those believers who em-
body the Koranic verse: They are harsh toward the
infidels but merciful among themselves . "1^
The duties of the proposed 6,000 man force were to include
helping with internal security, defending the country from
attack and infiltration, aiding the revolutionary courts, and
exporting the Islamic Revolution. The constitution of the




a. To safeguard the Islamic Revolution, expand it based
on the ideology of Islam, and carry out the demands of
the Islamic Republic.
2. Duties
a. Defending the country against attacks and occupation.
b. Cooperating with the government in security issues,
arresting counterrevolutionaries and other armed move-
ments that are against the Islamic Republic.
3. Formation
a. The composition of the IRGC will be based on the prin-
ciple of "non-concentration" and preserving the Central
Command. The general principles and policy of the IRGC
are determined by the Central Command with the approval
of the Coordination Council.
4. Members
a. Volunteers for the IRGC must have the following
qualifications
:
1. Belief in Islamic ideology.
2. Faith in the Islamic nature of the Revolution
and the Islamic Republic.
33

3. Possessing bravery, spiritual valor, as well as
physical and mental power.
4. Taking a stand against Eastern and Western im-
perialism, Zionism, racism, and dictatorship . 16
Prime Minister Bazargan fought the establishment of the
Corps and tried to prevent its expansion. He hesitated in
allocating funds to the guardsmen, thereby attempting to cut
1 7the flow of arms and ammunition to the Corps. At first,
it appeared that the Prime Minister would be successful in
his campaign against the guards when it was announced that
the Islamic "vigilantes" would be purged of some 4,000
1 o
members. But Bazargan' s request to the Ayatollah to
dilute the authority of the IRGC and to obtain more power
over the Pasdarans met stiff resistance in the Revolutionary
Council and the Prime Minister was forced to concede that the
militia was "here to stay." He conceded the necessity for
the Corps by stating, "This country needs the Pasdarans more
than any other time. When the Imam (Khomeini) gave me the
mission of leading the government, I did not appreciate this
need. I thought the old regime was gone and the new regime
19had replaced it. But later we saw this was not the case."
Later, in February 1980, Ayatollah Khomeini gave President
Bani-Sadr the supreme command over the armed forces in a move
to strengthen his authority and end the power dispersion in
the country. Making him head of the military, Khomeini
stated, "At this sensitive stage, when we need centralization
of power more than at any other stage, you, as my representative,
34

are appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces as defined
in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic." In addition, the
Ayatollah urged Bani-Sadr to reconstitute the military along
Islamic lines. As Commander-in-Chief, under Article 110 of the
Constitution, Bani-Sadr now had the right to declare war and
make peace, nominate the National Defense Council and appoint
the Chiefs of Staff and the IRGC Commander. 20
Armed with this authority, Bani-Sadr attempted to rein in
the revolutionary guards, which, by June 1980, had grown to a
force of some 30,000, far and above the original expectations
of 6,000. But the President's plan proved more difficult
than anticipated. The IRGC had no clear operational chain of
command which was complicated by the emergence of what appeared
to be two branches of the Pasdaran. One branch, or the "Central"
Corps, was nominally under the control of the ineffectual central
government, while the other carried out orders of the committees.
An aide of Bani-Sadr' s commented that there had been complaints
about some of the guardsmen and in Kurdistan 50 pasdars were
"dissolved" when they "had beaten up people and slandered and
imprisoned in ways reminiscent of SAVAK." In the Central Corps
"every bullet is accounted for, but in the committees, things
are different." However, excesses were noted in the center
as well. In June 1980, guardsmen opened fire after a funda-
mentalist mob attacked leftist militants, alarming both the
President and the Ayatollah, but drawing praise from the IRP
leader, Ayatollah Beheshti. On June 16, "Pasdar Day,"
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Khomeini addressed thousands of guardsmen, stressing that all
military personnel must answer to the President. He stated,
"The committees will remain as long as they are needed" but
would be purged along with revolutionary guards if the neces-
sity arose. Two days later, Bani-Sadr appealed to the guards-
men to remain above the political rivalry being played out
2
1
between the fundamentalists and their secular opponents.
In the midst of this, the head of the IRGC, Abbas Zamani
,
also known as Abu Sharif, stepped down from his position of
Commander, citing factionalism in the highly politicized
Corps as his reason for leaving. He blamed "monopolism,
sectarianism and existing tendencies" and stated, "We came
to build an army under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini,
backed by people and God, to support the oppressed of the
world and continue the Islamic Revolution. But, alas, power
seeking and group divisions and other present tendencies pre-
2 9
vented this movement." When Bani-Sadr appointed Abu Sharif
to the position, he stated it was a result of an almost un-
animous vote by other corps commanders. The President tasked
him to "put an end to group confrontations which have frus-
trated everybody." Abu Sharif was reported to have had dif-
ferences with the other corps commanders over the organization's
administration and he was unable to reach agreement with them.
The former commander was credited with much of the organization
of the revolutionary guards and was a guerrilla with the Shi's
36

2 3Amal group in Lebanon during the Lebanese civil war.
Instead of accepting Abu Sharif's request to step down, Bani
Sadr demoted him to Deputy Commander. His nominee for the
position, Muhammed Kanzem Bojnurdi, refused the post, and
finally, in July 1980, Mohsen Reza'i took command.
In a further effort to control the IRGC, the Imam's rep-
resentative to the Corps, in July 1980, submitted the follow'
ing directive to the guardsmen to adhere to: 1. Officers
would have to coordinate their military operations with
other armed forces and could not act individually. 2.
Those who were corrupt in faith, ideas and morals would be
purged. 3. Those guards who seized property or land and
arrested people without a lawful warrant would be handed
over to the revolutionary courts. 4. Full discipline in
the Corps and full obedience to the Commander-in-Chief and
the Corps Commander should be observed and a Justice Council
(Figure 2) would be established within the Corps to prose-
25
cute violators."
In April 1981, after a 3 day nation-wide seminar, the
IRGC commanders issued a resolution which demanded more
solidarity between the Corps and the armed forces and also
expanded on the duties and responsibilities of the IRGC.
The 7 articles of the resolution were as follows:
1. The IRGC has full responsibility for implementing
Islamic doctrines and principles of the law because of
its spiritual loyalty to Velayat-e Fagih.
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2. The IRGC will contribute to the exportation of the
Islamic Revolution by any means.
3. The IRGC is faithfully committed to Velayat-e Fagih
and will fulfill the Imam's revolutionary expectations
precisely.
4. With the proclamation of the "Year of Law," it is
expected that the Islamic Consultative Assembly, Majlis,
the Cabinet, the Supreme Judiciary Council will coordi-
nate their activities with the IRGC and the armed forces
to prevent counterrevolution and to reduce the number of
casualties in the war with Iraq.
5. The IRGC renewed its pledge to the Constitution, the
Imam's divine concepts, and the orders of the Revolu-
tionary Prosecutor-General to secure the Republic
against illegal political parties.
6. The mobilization of the "20 Million Member Army" is
the critical responsibility of the IRGC.
7. The IRGC gives its undivided support to Islamic
revolutionary movements around the world.
D. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE IRGC
Since its inception, the IRGC has grown in leaps and
bounds, in terms of numbers, as well as organizational struc-
ture. Figure 1 is an initial effort to clarify the relation-
ship of the Corps to the Supreme Defense Council (SDC) and
the other armed services, while Figure 2 shows a proposed
internal structure of the Corps. Certainly, neither chart
is the definitive piece on the IRGC and should serve as a
basis for future research on the topic.
On 12 October 1980, Ayatollah Khomeini ordered the forma
tion of a 7-man Supreme Defense Council (Figure 1) in order
to establish discipline and an effective chain of command
in the face of Iranian failures to repel Iraqi invaders.
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The SDC placed all of the armed forces, including the IRGC,
under a unified command, a move that should have been done
at the outbreak of the war. However, resistance by the
2 7IRGC had prevented its formation earlier.
Khomeini issued a decree on the authority of the SDC and
directed that the following points be implemented:
1. The SDC would supervise all matters related to the
Iran/Iraq war in conjunction with a deputy representing
the Majlis. The Council must coordinate all armed forces
which are duty bound to obey the SDC's orders.
2. The armed forces must follow the decisions of the SDC
at the battlefronts
.
3. The SDC will supervise publicity campaigns by radio,
television and press. The mass media and press must
'obtain permission from the SDC before publishing inter-
views, speeches, or writings.
4. The responsibility for foreign policy related to
defense lies with the SDC and no one is allowed to
interfere with it without permission.
5. Those who violate this decree are subject to arrest
and delivery to revolutionary courts.





The SDC was formed "according to the instructions of the
Imam to guide on the war affairs and its propaganda." As
part of the Council, a Publicity Committee was created to
coordinate foreign and internal publicity, publish "authentic"
and quick news reports, coordinate radio and television pro-
grams, and "display a united front against the enemy." To
coordinate these activities, the Publicity Committee issued
ordinances to cover the following:
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1. The mass media would coordinate reports and inter-
views that were related to political, military and
security issues with the SDC.
2. Interviews, statements and reports would not be pub-
lished without first checking with the Publicity Committee.
3. The Joint Staff Command of the Armed Forces, the
Security Headquarters of Tehran and other organizations
active in political, security and military issues were
directed to publish their statements through the
Publicity Committee.
4. Offices of the Islamic Government abroad, under the
direction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, were re-
quired to place all of their publicity and community
facilities at the disposal of the Headquarters.
5. The Ministry of Islamic Guidance would make its facil-
ities available to the Headquarters for the supply of
foreign and domestic publicity.
6. In issues relating to law enforcement and foreign
reports, the activities were to be coordinated by the
IRGC, committees, gendarmerie, and the police.
In May 1981, the Publicity Committee was renamed the War
Publicity Staff. 30
In November 1980, Dr. Mostafa Chamran, the Defense Minister
and a member of the Supreme Defense Council, announced the
formation of a headquarters for the coordination of guerrilla
warfare tactics (Figure 1) in Khuzistan. This headquarters
was seen as a "unifying link" between the army, the IRGC and
the Mobilization (Baseej) forces. Speaking of the coordina-
tion efforts between the guerrilla squads and the other forces,
Chamran said, "Its most important aspect is the people's faith
and self-sacrificing efforts to further the revolution and its
Islamic mission. Therefore, if we were to limit all our forces
40

to the army, we would clearly be mistaken. Our power is the
power of the people, the power of those huge waves of people
who enter the scene cf the battle overflowing with faith and
enthusiasm to create human epics... We can't afford to over-
look the people's resources. The Revolutionary Guards Corps
itself is a reflection of the people's force which has organ-
ized the youth."
At the same time, on the first anniversary of the establish'
ment of the "20 Million Member Army," (see Baseej) a military
spokesman told of the mobilization of the people against the
superpowers. He stated that, in an attempt to keep the United
States from regaining a foothold in Iran again, the IRGC had
organized a long-term project based on 3 premises:
1. Military training was to extend throughout the country
and reach every level of society, including the minorities.
2. Ideological education would be implemented to educate
soldiers for Islam and arm the men with "piety and revolu-
tionary morale."
3. These forces would be organized in order to "penetrate
the hearts of villages and towns to moblize the people
against superpowers' plots. ""
The military training referred to was entrusted in August
1980 to the army which was also made responsible for the train-
ing of the committees and the Baseej . In addition, the army
was to meet their needs with regards to ammunition, food,
transportation, medicine, and other logistical requirements
that the Corps may have.
In April 1982, the Prime Minister introduced the formation
of a Coordination Council for Islamic Revolutionary movements
41

throughout the country in an effort to provide coordination
among various revolutionary organizations. Councils for the
provinces and cities would be established under the super-
vision of Governor-Generals, Governors, Friday prayer leaders,
and heads of the revolutionary institutions, in which the
34
IRGC was included.
E. INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF THE IRGC
In many cases, one can merely guess at the internal struc-
ture of the Corps, since a branch might be mentioned casually
in a newspaper, with little indication of what chain of command
it follows in the organization. Unfortunately, this is more
often the rule than the exception. Therefore, the following
explanation of the internal structure of the IRGC (Figure 2)
will be sketchy at best.
1. The Command Council of the Guards is responsible for
the appointment of operational commanders, and this is done
every 6 months for the Commander of the IRGC in Tehran,
which is not to be confused with the overall Commander of
the Corps.
2. The Imam's representative in the Corps is the
Ayatollah's eyes and ears within the Corps and delivers
directives to the commanders from Khomeini. In a July 1980
directive, it was ordered that a Justice Council be estab-
lished within the Corps to prosecute those who violated
orders from the Commander-in-Chief as well as the commanders
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of the various services. It is suggested that this Justice
Council is under the jurisdiction of the Prosecutor of the
IRGC. 36
3. The Public Relations Office of the Central Command
issues communiques to the public concerning activities of
the IRGC. One such communique attempted to clear up con-
fusion over who was and was not a legitimate guardsman.
It informed the public that all guardsmen ivere dressed in
official uniforms, carried official I.D. cards, and in the
case of an assignment, carried assignment papers.
The Publications Departments also deals with the cultural
aspects of the IRGC and helps to propagandize views on the
Islamic Revolution to the rest of the world. The magazine,
Message of the Revolution, is printed by the IRGC, and like
their other publications, is an attempt to advise the guards
37
as well as act as a guideline for others.
4. Any grievances against the Corps are brought to the
38
attention of the Prosecutor-General of the IRGC.
5. There is also a Coordination Headquarters for Public
Education which organizes those men and women who have re-
39
ceived military education.
6. Each service has a Politico- Ideological Office, as
well as a Reconstruction Jihad, which works with the engi-
40
neering units of the Corps. It has set up logistical, cul-
tural and relief activities, as well as repair shops, moved
41
war wounded and POW's, and supplied foodstuffs and ammunition.
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7. The Center for the Promotion of Islamic Movements is
a division of the IRGC and urges Iranians to support Islamic
movements throughout the world by giving donations to the
Bank of Melli Iran in Qom. The account was opened by
42Ayatollah Montazeri.
Another unit which deals with the exportation of the
Islamic Revolution is the Liberation Movements Unit which may
well have ties with the Center for the Promotion of Islamic
Movements. Its purpose is to establish "fraternal relations
and contacts with those movements fighting for freedom from
the servitude and fetters of Western and Eastern imperialism
and world Zionism." The Islamic Revolution in Iran is to act
as the example for the future successes of similar revolutions
According to Mohsen Reza'i, the Commander of the IRGC, the
Corps had established relations with over 70 revolutionary
44
movements throughout the Islamic world by July 1981.
As a step towards implementing liberation movements, the
Golan Battalion was formed as "a more massive army of the
Muslim world for liberating Qods (Jerusalem) ." This was in
response to a Jordanian campaign to raise a force to fight
alongside the Iraqis in the Iran/Iraq war. The Joint Staff
was given permission to form the battalion, however, it was
IRGC Commander Reza'i who announced the Golan Battalion's
formation and said it would consist of refugees, "volunteer"
45
Iraqi POW's and revolutionary guardsmen. Once formed, the




to station the battalion on the borders to "fight against the
46Zionist regime." In June 1982, a joint communique issued
by the army command and the IRGC announced the deployment of
Iranian volunteer units to southern Lebanon but no mention
47
was made of the Golan Battalion.
The IRGC also works with the National Organization of
Scouts in the area of frontier scouting and the implementa-
tion of a war training center. Although this unit may also
be an aspect of Baseej training, it is more likely to be under
the auspices of the Center for the Promotion of Islamic Move-
ments since the Scouts organization asked permission to send
2000 scouts along with 2000 "revolutionary fighters" to Mecca
during the Haj (pilgrimage) ceremonies, in order to "intro-
duce and spread the message of the Islamic Revolution."
Certainly, that aspect of the Scouts would be responsible
48
to the Islamic Movements Center. Leading Iran's mass Haj
to Mecca, is Hojatolislam Mousavi Khoeyniha, clerical advisor
to the Students Following the Imam's Line who seized the
49American Embassy on 4 November 1979.
Although not specifically assigned to the IRGC, a Youth
Corps was established in January 1980, and was tasked with
spreading Khomeini's revolutionary message throughout the
Moslem world. Since its inception, one of the main functions
of the IRGC has been the exportation of the Islamic Revolution.
It is therefore assumed that the Youth Corps, like the Scouts
Organization, takes its direction from the IRGC. The Youth
45

Corps was to be trained in Qora by religious and ideological
instructors and would "create a pioneering force of young
men who will lead the revolutionary struggle and outline the
road to export the Islamic Revolution to its natural dimen-
sion throughout the Moslem countries until they are united
under the banner of Islam." The purpose of the Corps was
to establish a "special ideological training program for
Arab youth." This was seen by Arab countries as an attempt
by the Iranians to form cells of supporters for the Ayatollah
throughout the Arab world.
The training program for the youths would consist of 2
months of "ideological and religious training" and youths up
to 25 years old who knew Arabic, had a university degree, and
who had good religious standing were eligible to join. The
principle recruiting station was to be set up in Abadan where
many ethnic Arabs live.
8. Following the revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini stressed
that an "Islamic country had to be military in all aspects
and equipped with military training." It was his feeling
that in order for the Islamic Republic to survive, Iran's 20
million youths should be armed and, therefore, protect the
nation with an invulnerable shield. In order to provide this
"20 Million Member Army," the Baseej-e Mostazafin (Mobiliza-
tion of the Oppressed) was formed on 26 November 1979 under
the jurisdiction of the IRGC. It ivas established to "safe-
guard the fruits of the Islamic Revolution" when the United
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States threatened economic sanctions, froze Iranian assets,
and the U.S. fleet approached the Persian Gulf following the
student takeover of the American Embassy. Comprised mostly
of teenagers and younger individuals, the Baseej also re-
cruits women, students, office workers, and trains its
people in military techniques and weaponry. Aside from
military training, the Baseej also augments the political
and ideological education of its members. In June 1982,
it was announced by the head of the Public Mobilization
(Baseej) of the IRGC, Hojatolislam Salek, that 46 summer
training camps would be established in order to "raise the
level of political, ideological and military knowledge of
52the popular forces of the "20 Million Member Army."
With branches throughout Iran, in addition to being re-
sponsible for improving on the ideological, political and
military knowledge of the Iranian people, the Baseej was
also tasked with safeguarding cities and towns and maintain-
ing their security. They have encountered smugglers and
counterrevolutionaries and, following the outbreak of the
Iran/Iraq war, the Baseej sent its members to the fronts,
which is their most important duty at present. Imbued with
"total faith and reliance on Almighty Allah," the Baseej
members "fight without any expectation of reward, recogni-
tion, and if martyred in the battle, they fall unknown."
Incidents such as the taking of 40 Iraqi prisoners by a
47

teenager, walking across minefields to clear a path for regu-
lar units and running headlong into Iraqi positions in suici-
dal human wave assaults have all been attributed to members
of the Baseej
.
9. The Social Affairs office coordinates and organizes
those men and women who are placed on alert by the mobiliza-
tion unit in each IRGC headquarters. Those who have completed
their training in mosques and military barracks, as well as
those students who undergo a 10-day summer course may be
placed on alert. It is not certain if these mobilization
units operate out of District headquarters or are at the
provincial level.
10. The Information Unit of the IRGC appears to be an
intelligence branch which is mentioned infrequently in com-
muniques. It was responsible for tracking former Foreign
Minister, Sadeq Qotbzadeh, and arresting him for an attempted
r C
coup plot in April 1982. Reference has been made to the
"56 Million Information Unit" which has been credited, along
with the IRGC, in uncovering counterrevolutionary plots and
the coup plot of Sadeq Qotbzadeh. In one instance, the
Tehran Times (12 January 1982, p. 2) referred to the "36
Million Member Information Unit" as the Iranian people.
However, this could also be the official title of the Infor-
mation Unit of the IRGC.
11. Operational responsibility is shared with the army,
although the IRGC and the army have separate chains of command.
48

Commanders appear to be interchangeable, as an army officer
may be the Operational Commander of an IRGC headquarters.
Iranian newspapers stress this as being a further indication
of the unity between the two services. The army is also
responsible for training guards in army units in areas such
as weapons handling and parachuting. Operational respon-
siblity within the IRGC is further broken down to the pro-
vincial level where there is a headquarters D and to a
district level which can act as military, political and
ideological training centers for guards as well as Baseej
5 8
units. Each IRGC headquarters has a mobilization unit
which places those who have received training on alert.
(see 9)
12. Guards are also used by Anti-Narcotics headquarters
59
which operate from committees in various cities. Considered
independent institutions, the committees, in April 1982, came
under the jurisdiction and supervision of the Ministry of
Interior, which was also tasked with the security (police,
gendarmerie and committees) functions in Iran. Authority
over military forces-ground, air, naval forces, and the
IRGC-was delegated to the Chief of the Joint Staff. It was
stressed that guards working with these committees would not
be merged with the police force.
AN IDEOLOGICAL ARiMY
"You have offered in the path of Allah the biggest asset
you had: your life and soul. It is the same of those
who were martyred and may they be now in the presence
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of Allah. What really matters is such a willingness
(for martyrdom). You are sacrificing your lives,
marching towards the battlefields of war equipped with
the ideology of martyrdom, defending Islam and your
school of thought, and are frustrating the countries
which look on this country with eyes full of greed.
What made you victors and is bringing you success is
that faith and sincerity you have. A thing you pos-
sess but they do not. You enter into combat for
Allah and they for the Devil. They belong to the
6
,
party of Satan and you belong to the party of God."
- Ayatollah Khomeini, 1982
Religion has historically played an important role in
Iran's national identity and traces its roots to those fol-
lowers of Ali, son-in-law of Muhammad, who believed that his
male descendents should be the successors to the Prophet.
Emotion ran high around the contraversy of succession and
political legitimacy and at the murder of Ali (661), his
second son, Husayn, claimed leadership, but he and his fol-
lowers were massacred by the Umayyad Cahiph, Yazid, in 680
at Karbala. The date of the massacre, the tenth (Ashura) of
Muharram (10 October), has since been emotionally celebrated
by Shi' as (party of Ali) as they commemorate the martyrdom
of Husayn and his brother, Hasan. Karbala is considered one
of the holiest shrines of Shi' ism and is the scene of "passion
plays" which reenact the massacre on its anniversary.
Exhibiting the depth of their grief over the martyrdom of
Husayn, men and young boys cut their foreheads and parade
through the streets beating their backs with chains.
A pivotal belief in Shi'a Islam is the doctrine of the
Imamate. In Shi' ism, the Imam possesses not only the temporal
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sovereignty inherited from Muhammad, but also is an impeccable
infallible teacher who is able to interpret the law. Twelver
Shi' ism, the majority sect, holds that there was a succession of
12 Imams to Muhammad al-Muntazar, who disappeared, is hidden,
and is expected to return as a saviour (Mahdi) of the world.
Love and devotion to Ali, the first Imam, was the only guide
for determining true faith. If an individual did not acknow-
ledge the true Imam, then his salvation was lost. Shi' ism
became the traditional opposition party as it not only insisted
on the recognition of the rightful Imam, but also challenged
the authority of existing governments. Those who found their
right usurped by the rulers were attracted to Shi' ism and, as
a result, it became a part of early revolutions. Tashayyu
(Shi' ism) came to represent the deprived and oppressed and in
recent times, a more radical or defiant form has taken shape,
"Tashayyu-i Alavi" or "Tashayyu-i Sorkh." It "strongly
associates Islam as an ideology with revolutionary politics,
the struggle against social and political tyranny, and the
equitable distribution of wealth." Two of the most ardent
proponents of this "theology of liberation" have been
f\ 7
Ayatollah Khomeini and Dr. Ali Shariati.
Following the Revolution, because of the military threats
from outside of Iran as well as from counterrevolutionaries,
Khomeini supported the establishment of an "ideological"
army. In such an army, order and discipline would be strickly
observed; posts and responsibilities were given in accordance
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with competence and liability and not on the basis of rela-
tions; there should be no unjust discrimination and Islamic
equity must rule; deeds, words, behavior, and regulations
would be based on Islamic criteria; dictatorship, self-
interest and monopoly were to be eliminated according to
68Article 3 of the Constitution.
Unlike conventional governmental or military organiza-
tions, the revolutionary guards are considered to have the
following special characteristics:
"Instead of employing individuals, as done by the various
military and even revolutionary organizations and struc-
tures, the revolution guards corps accept membership.
This means that it does not have a special section for
appointing individuals, but has forces in charge of
investigating and choosing personnel from among the
volunteers. It has happened several times that 20,
30 or 40 volunteers offered their services, but no
more than 2 of them were chosen to become members.
The members must have faith in the Islamic creed and
the unified world Islamic nation. These are among the
qualifications required for membership. They must also
have faith in the Islamic revolution and love of jihad
and martyrdom. Those individuals who desire to obtain
money must not join the revolution guards. " v ^
References to the Qur'an emphasize that one should first
become a conscious believer and then pursue a jihad. There-
fore, an Islamic army should be armed with faith first and
then with weapons. During Muhammad's time, faith lead the
Islamic forces to victory and it is believed that today is
no different. According to the Qur'an, a fighter who is
imbued with faith is worth 10 times in fighting ability
than a member who is not. Looking back in Islamic history,
it is pointed out that in those wars fought in the founding
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stages of Islam, in most of them, the enemy forces were
between 3 and 10 times stronger than Islamic forces. It is
7 nbelieved that faith was their secret weapon, as it is today.
Said one young guardsman, "God is witnessing our actions.
We are going from one world to a more exalted and lofty
world. And we are ready to die because martyrdom is the
best path to that world and we shall receive the greatest
welcome."
President Khomeni'i stressed in a meeting with the IRGC
members that it was on the battlefield and nowhere else
where man could profoundly understand religion. It is also
there that on sees the development of the human being 'under
the effects of faith and commitment. He added that many
Iranians would not have been as .devoted and faithful without
the war. He interpreted Ayatollah Khomeini's quote "Greatest
of the victories" as what a man would achieve by being on the
war fronts. It was not surprising that "enemies of the revo-
lution" would be active against the IRGC because, as he
stated, "You are the fruit of the revolution, with whose
7 ?
destruction, the revolution would be destroyed."' Said
Khomeini about his ideological army, "The IRGC is equipped
with Divine Power; their weapon is "Allaho Akbar," which no
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Iran is a myriad of ethnic groups- -eight major ones--
whose tradition of resisting the central government is well
established. However, it was the Kurds, shortly after the
success of the Iranian revolution, who first pressed for their
much desired autonomy from the central government and posed
the strongest threat of open revolt.
Of the approximately 10-15 million Kurds, four million
live in Iran, while the remainder are spread throughout Iraq,
Turkey, and in smaller numbers in Syria, Lebanon and the
Soviet Union. The dream of an independent Kurdish state was
short-lived, when in 1946 there was a Soviet supported
"Kurdish autonomous republic" with Mahabad as its capital.
The Shah ended the republic a year later and forced the rebel
leader, Mullah Mustafa Barzani, into the Soviet Union where
he stayed in exile for 15 years. In the late 1950's he re-
turned to Iraq to foment revolts and caused the Baghdad
government to turn to the Soviets for help in this matter.
In 1973, the Baathist government signed a "strategic alliance"
with the USSR and invited a Marxist wing of Barzani' s Kurdish
Democratic Party (KDP) to participate in the government. As
Iraq moved closer to Moscow, Barzani moved to the West,
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accepting help from the CIA and Israel, through the Shah of
Iran. In 1975 in Algiers, as part of the Iran-Iraq agreement,
the Iranians ceased their aid to the Kurds which promptly ended
their revolt. Within the Kurdish movement there were several
political, mostly leftist, factions which alienated the more
conservative element of the population. The most established
is the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) which is suspected of
being influenced by the Iraqi Baathists and has, therefore,
lost some support. There is a leftist guerrilla group which
operates on the Iraqi border, and a new group is emerging that
was organized by Saved Mohammad Nezami, an educator. The
fourth gr.oup, which is not leftist, is composed of the fol-
lowers of Mustafa Barzani.
2
. Dashed Hopes
The Kurds enthusiastically joined in the Islamic re-
volution as it provided them with the hope that they would
attain the recognition and autonomy that had been denied them
for centuries. As many as two million Kurds fought along side
Khomeini's forces, but the victory of the revolution was not
to signal success for their cause. The spiritual and political
leaders of the Kurds, Ayatollah Ezzedin Hosseini, remarked,
"... for us, the Revolution is not over... We fought in the
revolution not out of religious conviction but for political
goals. We want autonomy- -our own Parliament, our own lan-
guage, our own culture. The Revolution has destroyed des-
potism, but it has not ended discrimination against minorities.
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The revolution must go on until all major minority groups--
the Kurds here, the Turks in Azerbaijan, the Baluchis in the
East- -win a measure of autonomy." Another Kurd stressed that
his people were not interested in a separate state, only
autonomy, and since the new central government was still weak,
he felt the time was right to press their demands. In the
event that their demands were not met, he stated, "If we don't
get autonomy, however, we will launch a guerrilla war. We
have the experience and we have the guns."
The fledgling Islamic Republic feared that if it gave
into the demands of the Kurds, a strong separatist movement
might develop among the other minority groups and destroy any
plans of an Islamic state. Quickly disillusioned with the
results of the revolution, the Kurds in Mehabad seized an
army barracks shortly after the Shah left Iran. Faced with
open rebellion, Khomeini's government sent the Minister of
Labor, Daryoush Farouhar, and a delegation to listen to the
Kurd's demands, which, basically, asked for autonomy.**
3 . The Fighting Begins
The unrest spread to Sanandaj , the provincial Kurdistan
capital, where, in guerrilla- like fashion, the Kurds took to
the roof tops to direct their gunfire against the local army
barracks. The fighting began when the Kurds asked for ammuni-
tion, were refused, and then began a sit-in which ended
violently. Taking advantage of a short truce, the Kurds
were able to reorganize and laid siege to the police station,
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as well as the barracks and occupied the airfield and the
radio station. In response to their attack on the army,
Khomeini warned the Kurds that those who attacked the army
would be considered foreign agents and counterrevolutionaries
and that the armed forces would be told to respond with full
force. Said Deputy Prime Minister Amir Entezam, "We shall
crush the attackers. We will use all means at our disposal
to put down the uprising. There are unscrupulous elements
at work in Kurdistan who think they can take advantage of the
situation because the army is weak. We want to show them the
4
army is not weak."
Shortly after the Kurds in Sanandaj received a promise
of "semi-autonomy" from Hadj Said Djavadi, the Minister of the
Interior, fighting broke out between Turkoman minorities and
guardsmen in the town of Gonbad-e Qavus , near the Soviet border.
As the central government had feared, the Kurdish desire for
autonomy had permeated other ethnic minorities and resulted
in still more violence. The Turkoman Political and Cultural
Society, which had organized a boycott against the upcoming
referendum on the Islamic Republic demanded that Turkomans
be allowed membership in the local Komiteh, and that land in
the area should no longer be owned by Iranians of non-Persian
5
origin.
4 . The Calm before the Storm
Relative calm descended on the area after a Kurd was
appointed governor general of the province of Kurdistan.
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The Chief of the armed forces, General Valli Gharini, was
dismissed by the provisional government after he ordered
helicopter gunships to fire on the Kurds during the violence
in Sanadaj . He had also been unable to convince thousands
of officers and men to return to their units after the col-
lapse of the Pahlavi dynasty.
Other problems had begun to surface as a result of the
influx of revolutionary guardsmen who were young, inexperienced
and flushed with the relative ease of the success of the revol-
ution. Enforcing their role as defenders of Iran's internal
security, the guardsmen became the living symbol of what the
Kurds despised most in the new government. Their radical and
overt Shi' ism was a constant reminder to the Sunni Kurds of
their continuing second-class status.
Tensions began to mount once more and fighting broke
out again in Marivan near the Iraqi border in July. This was
a result of a Kurdish complaint that the guards were arming
local landlords so that they could seize lands given the
peasants under the Shah's land reform program. To diffuse
this, the government promised a delegation to investigate the
guards' activities, and in return, the Kurds agreed not to
7
carry arms and to help in the security of Marivan.
5 . Open Revolt
The calm was very short lived as fighting broke out
with the revolutionary guardsmen in the town of Paveh on the




Paveh had beheaded 18 guardsmen after a 2,000 man Kurdish
force attacked the city and overpowered the 200 guardsmen
who were defending it. Ayatollah Khomeini acted swiftly,
stepping over military and government leaders, ordering the
armed forces to crush the rebellion in 24 hours. In his ul-
timatum to the army, Khomeini warned: "If no positive acti<
has been taken within 24 hours, the heads of the army and
state police will be held responsible." This was directed
at those moderate officers who had dominated the army command
at the end of the revolution and were reluctant to use the
army units to quell the disturbances. A large part of this
hesitation was based on past experiences where army commanders,
who had carried out orders which were later to become politi-
cally unpopular, were later punished. The Ayatollah's order
read as follows: "As head of the whole army, I give the
orders to the army Commander-in-Chief to move into the area
with all necessary preparations, and I also give orders to
the army garrisons and state police forces that, without
awaiting any further order and wasting any time, they
move toward Paveh with the necessary ammunition, preparation
and forces." This order followed an attack the Ayatollah
made on the government and military for not exhibiting
o
enough revolutionary zeal. In addition, Khomeini banned
the Kurdish Democratic Party for its part in the Paveh
Rebellion saying it was "poison to the health of the revol-
ution." The government also declared that the election of
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the KDP's Secretary-General, Abdurahman Qassemlou, to the
Assembly of Experts reviewing the draft of Iran's new con-
stitution, was null and void.
Those Kurds captured by the government forces once
Paveh was retaken, were executed for being "corrupt on earth
and warriors against God and his prophets." Those captured
received their sentencing in Ayatollah Khalkali's revolution-
9
ary courts, and the sentences were carried out by the IRGC.
As a response to these executions, the leaders of the KDP
threatened retaliation in a communique which stated, "Now
we have arrested many guards and if the executions (of Kurds)
continue, the KDP will execute one revolutionary guard for
each Kurd executed."
No sooner had the situation in Paveh been diffused,
than Ayatollah Khomeini put the armed forces on alert through-
out the country and ordered them to put down a reported revolt
in Sanandaj . The Governor of Kurdistan denied the rumors of
violence and that hostages had been taken. He did relate a
minor incident in which "Three lorry-loads of revolutionary
guards were disarmed and prevented from leaving Sanandaj by
the people of the city." There were also indications of dis-
cord within the armed forces at being ordered to put down
this rebellion. Troops were cautioned that special courts
would be convened for those soldiers who refused to obey
12
orders or took part in the strikes. Clearly, it appeared
that the new government was hesitant to trust the armed
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forces in maintaining internal security, as the threat of an
array coup was uppermost in most of the politicians' minds.
The problem, then, of taking care of internal security rested
squarely on the shoulders of the revolutionary guardsmen, who
had managed to alienate the Kurds. Evidence of this could be
seen in the casualty reports where guardsmen, not regular
army soldiers, had become targets for the Kurdish bullets.
6. The 18 -Day War
The second strong warning against military disobedience
in a week was issued by the Ayatollah when government forces
were put on the defensive in the town of Saqqez. In addition,
Khomeini ordered the revolutionary guards to cooperate with
the regular army, indicating there were even problems within
the ranks of the armed forces. In order to restore morale,
he stated: "I hereby announce my solemn backing for the Armed
Forces, the State and regular police." In an effort to bring
the rebellious tribesmen into line, he offered them amnesty
13
and a day's oil revenue to cease their insurrection.
In spite of their use of superior weapons and support
from tanks, helicopters, heavy artillery and Phantoms, the
guardsmen, although eventually victorious, proved to be a
sad match against the haphazardly armed Kurds. In Saqqez,
tribal guerrillas, who acquired reinforcements from neigh-
boring towns, fought 5,000 revolutionary guardsmen against
their 2,000 man force. Government troops were driven back
12 miles along the road to Sanandaj , and the Kurds were
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able to lay siege to the army barracks in Saqqez. After two
days, a combination of revolutionary guards and regular army
troops were able to break through the Kurdish lines, but the
battle for the city continued for another two days. The Kurds
made a "tactical retreat" to the hills as both sides began
preparing for a major battle over the Kurdish stronghold at
14Mahabad.
All indications pointed to a fierce battle over Mahabad
however, after a concentrated air and armor attack, all the
Kurdish guerrillas and many of the city's inhabitants escaped
towards Sardasht in the south. This occupation of the
Kurdish stronghold seemed to have broken the back of the
Kurdish resistance. As of 12 September, the 18-day war had
ended with all Kurdish towns back in government control. As
calm descended once again on the area, some Army officers ad-
vocated keeping a low profile and having the revolutionary
guards withdrawn from Kurdistan "because their presence only
worries the people." The army insisted that the guardsmen
remain on the outskirts of Mahabad after its capture, because
the "population felt reassured by the troops, but did not want
the guards."
7 . Guerrilla Warfare
Just weeks after their retreat from Mahabad, the Kurds
began waging a guerrilla war on dozens of towns, targeting
revolutionary guardsmen in ambushes. These instances under-
lined the growing problem that the security forces were
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encountering in the face of a very resiliant Kurdish movement.
In addition, the revolutionary guards were suffering from a
"lack of acceptance" by the local population and proved to be
17
easy targets in the Kurdish hit-and-run operations. After
one such operation, in which 50 guardsmen were killed, the
Iranian Defense Minister, Dr. Chamran, flew to Kurdistan to
take charge personally of the chaotic internal security system
in light of the general disorder in the security forces. Major
General Hassein Shaku, Chief of the Joint Military Staff, told
of the chaotic state of affairs when he related the story of
the ambush. The guardsmen who were ambushed, disobeyed orders
not to leave their base near Sardasht , failed to report their
departure and did not say where they were going. Communica-
tions was another area that had serious faults. Said the
operations commander of the guards, Hossein Soltani, "prac-
tically all telephone or telegraphic messages we send are
intercepted by the rebels , and they have prior information
on all our operations." Pac^d with this organized Kurdish
resistance, there were reports of closing revolutionary
guards' garrisons.
Dr. Chamran pledged that military operations against
the rebels would intensify and that helicopters and tanks
would be used to flush out the guerrillas. However, other
military sources suggested that the real priority would be
repairing relations between the regular army and the guards,
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since the lack of cooperation between the two corps had only-
been magnified by the ambush in which 50 guardsmen were
killed. 1
8 . Cease Fire
The inability of the security forces to control the
Kurdish situation was made evident when the guerrillas retook
Mahabad and managed to kidnap the governor's representative
in daylight. Fighting from Mahabad spread to other towns
even as Ayatollah Khomeini appeared to reverse his policy of
imposing a military solution on the guerrillas. In the midst
of the renewed violence, the central government negotiated a
cease-fire and promised to meet the Kurds' legitimate rights.
A key provision in the cease-fire agreement was the promise
of the withdrawals of the revolutionary guard units from the
area. Later it was charged by a KDP spokesman that instead
of the withdrawal that they had requested, the guardsmen and
army units were being reinforced. A three man government
mission met with members of the KDP to discuss the autonomy
issue, but new unrest mounted in Kurdistan, as well as among
the Azerbaij anis , Baluchis and Turkomans, as rioting over the
referendum for the new Islamic constitution spread. Since
these minority groups were mostly Sunni Moslems, their objec-
tions to the constitution came over the provision which made
20
Shi ' ism the official national religion.
As new areas erupted in fighting, Iran entered a new
phase of its revolution, that of regional violence. Even the
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array was not left unscathed by this regionalism, since, tradi-
tionally, the backbone of the military officer corps came from
Azerbaijan. Any faith in the former Shah's army might have
been further weakened in view of the continuing violence, and
Khomeini's confidence in being able to count on his armed
forces certainly dwindled. The central government was forced
to rely on the revolutionary guards to restore order which
only compounded the regional complaints, as the guards did
not observe local customs and in many instances, ransacked
21homes without search warrants. In an attempt to keep the
peace and restore the people's confidence, the Governor-
General of Kurdistan ordered a group of revolutionary guards
22
arrested for firing into an angry crowd.**
9 . Renewed Fighting
Once again, Mahabad became the focus of heavy fighting,
as a result of a long promised government move in which the
Deputy Governor of West Azerbaijan Province explained: "The
objective of the operation is to purge the city of counter-
revolutionaries as soon as possible."
After a lull of four months in the fighting, clashes
broke out again, signalling the breakdown in negotiations.
A standstill was reached when the Secretary-General of the
KDP, Abdurahman Qassemlou, announced the Kurds would not put
down their arms until they had received autonomy, and at the
same time, President 3ani-Sadr and the Revolutionary Council hard-
2 3
ened their stand. 4* Following this, heavy fighting broke out in
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May 19 80 in Saqqez, Sardasht, Baneh and Marivan. In a sur-
prise move, after throwing 10,000 fighters into the city, the
rebels withdrew from Sanandaj , and the government took ad-
vantage of this by presenting this as a victory. In fact,
it was a move to harrass the government troops.
When the Iranian troops retook the city, they found
the bodies of 48 of their men dumped in a ditch outside of
the city. Inside, the bodies of 45 pasdars were found buried
in a mass grave. The rebels had been able to hold onto the
city for a month by blockading the streets and maintained
24
communications through the sewers and a series of trenches.
The extent of the carnage was so great in the month long siege
at Sanandaj , that bodies were often burned quickly in the
courtyards of private homes. Speaking of the guardsmen, a
Kurd whose brother was killed in a house search in Sanandaj
,
said, "They've committed worse atrocities than anything seen
in Vietnam." Sheikh Hosseini reemphasized the hatred of the
guards when he remarked, "The Iranian Army can stay, but the
revolutionary guards must go."
Shortly after the September 1980 outbreak of the Iran/
Iraq war, fighting in Kurdistan began again, this time \vith
Baghdad's help. Kurdish guerrillas struck at Iranian troops
from mountain bases behind Iraq's front line, and Baghdad
backed Kurdish demands for autonomy. The insurgents were
also receiving money and weapons from the Iraqi government
25
as well as help from Iraqi officers. In some areas of
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the northwest region, Iranian troops found themselves fighting
against the Iraqi invasion in the west and the Kurds on the
east of the frontier. In an attempt to ease its "two front"
or "second war" dilemma, the Iranian government offered pardons
to those insurgents who would lay down their arms. Like the
previous appeals and ultimatums made by the Islamic government,
this one also went unheeded.
After two years of sporadic fighting, the clashes be-
came heavy once again, as the Kurds regained Mahabad. The
guerrillas were able to mount a successful counterattack
because two Iranian divisions were withdrawn from the area
27
to boost forces elsewhere." According to recent boasts by
Secretary General Qassemlou, "We have now a liberated terri-
tory of 60,000 square kilometres (about half of Iranian
Kurdistan) which we totally control, except the main roads
through which the Pasdars can travel during the day but not
during the night."" Qassemlou summed up the Kurdish situa-
tion when he said, "We were fighting Khomeini before the
Iraqis, and I have the impression we'll be fighting him
29
after them too.""
B. THE MUJAHIDIN-E KHALQ ORGANIZATION (MKO)
1. Background
There are two noteworthy armed leftist groups which
claimed a key role in the revolution and, therefore, felt
they had earned the right to a voice in what transpired next
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in the government. They operated throughout the 1970' s as un-
derground urban guerrillas, often attacking U.S. military
30personnel who symbolized the Shah's regime.
The Fedayeen-e Kahlq is a nationalist, Marxist group
on the far left which draws its support from students and
radical members of the intelligentsia. In 1980, the Fedayeen
split into three groups--the Fedayeen Guerrillas (Cherikha)
,
the Minority (Aqaliyyat) , and the Majority (Aksariyyat) . The
Guerrilla and Minority groups have chosen to pursue radical
goals, while the Majority has shown a desire to compromise
31
with the right wing extremist Iranian Republican Party (IRP)
.
But it was the Mujahidin, the largest organization numbering
approximately 100,000, which became the most feared of the
opposition groups. Like the Fedayeen, the Mujahidin was
formed in the 1960 f s but had its origins from the religious
wing of the National Front and in particular, the Liberation
Movement of Iran. Beginning with a small group of nine in
Tehran, it expanded into cells throughout the country and
began a guerrilla training program when it sent six of its
members to a PLO training camp in Jordan. Espousing a "class-
less" society, the Mujahidin concluded that true Shi' ism was
against depotism, capitalism, imperialism, and conservative
32
clericalism. Their feeling on religion was as follows:
"After years of extensive study into Islamic history and
Shi'ite ideology, our organization has reached the firm con-
clusion that Islam, especially Shi' ism, will play a major
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role in inspiring the masses to join the revolution. It will
do so because Shi' ism, particularly Hussein's historic act of
resistance, has both a revolutionary- message and a special
38place in our popular culture."
Although the Mujahidin was oriented towards Islam, it
developed an ideology not too far removed from the Marxist
Fedayeen. In 1975, the organization split into two factions,
those who wanted to declare the Mujahidin a Marxist -Leninist
organization (Pakyar) while the other faction wanted to retain
its Islamic orientation. Each organization had its own publi-
cations, armed wing, and activities which included bank rob-
beries, bombings, and assassinations. By the outbreak of the-
revolution, the two Mujahidin factions and the Fedayeen groups
had several years of guerrilla experience and were equipped
for the ensuing confrontation. They were further bolstered
in early 1978 when the Shah released 618 political prisoners.
This enabled the groups to mount a major assault on the army
when members of the Shah's elite Imperial Guard tried to
thwart a coup attempt by air force cadets in Tehran. The
guerrillas moved en masse to the aid of the cadets and suc-
cessfully defeated the Guards. Prisons were opened, and
police stations, armories, and military bases were ransacked
with similar instances occurring in the provinces. The
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. Aftermath of the Revolution
Soon after Ayatollah Khomeini's return to Iran, it
became apparent that those groups that had aided in the down-
fall of the Shah would not be content without some voice in
the new government. The People's Mujahidin (Islamic Freedom
Fighters) issued a warning to Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan,
head of the provisional government, stating that if their
demands went unmet, "the revolution would be faced with
serious problems." Massoud Rajavi, the head of the Mujahidin,
demanded the immediate dissolution of the ex-Shah's army and
its replacement by a "People's Army." Along with the Fedayeen,
the Mujahidin further called for the establishment of "People's
Councils" which would administer public affairs and hold public
trials
.
Some 300,000 weapons were looted from government ar-
senals during the revolution, and both guerrilla groups refused
to surrender their share. Because of this refusal to disarm,
the provisional government which had been unable to establish
proper control over the country, was threatened with a serious
problem. Ayatollah Khomeini called on the army and police to
return to their posts and cooperate in defeating this threat
to Iran. In a strong warning, Khomeini stated, "All sections
of the community, under any name, must pursue their activities
under the Islamic flag, otherwise, their actions would con-
stitute an uprising against the revolutionary Islamic govern-




It was the revolutionary guards, whose task it was to
maintain internal security, who were eventually called upon to
deal with the Mujahidin. Fiercely attacking the leftists as
"Counterrevolutionaries" Ayatollah Khomeini called for a
"purge of Westernized thought from the universities" where the
Mujahidin and other groups had established their strongholds.
The Mujahidin, composed mainly of students and middle class
intellectuals, had been forced out of their offices and onto
university campuses where guardsmen, at the disposal of the
Bureau for the Campaign against Sin, made raids against their
37illegal phamplet and cassette operations. The Revolutionary
council ordered the leftists to close their campus offices
and Ayatollah Khomeini called for the early closing of the
universities in order to carry out a cultural revolution which
would purge Western thought. Campuses throughout Iran were
overrun by the Students Following the Imam's Line, the mili-
tants who were also holding the U.S. embassy officials hostage.
As they overran the universities, the militants demanded
"Islamif ication. " Revolutionary guardsmen were on hand, fir-
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ing into the air in order to separate the groups. Similar
violence continued and reached a height in June 1980 when
100,000 Mujahidin, involved in a rally in a stadium across
from the U.S. embassy, spilled into the streets and were
attacked by fundamentalists. The IRGC opened fire on tens
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of thousands of rioting demonstrators and more than 300
39people were injured in the ensuing five hour gun battle.
4 . The Bombing Era
It was not until June 1981, when Bani-Sadf was dis-
missed as President of the Islamic Republic, that Iran felt
the full force of the wrath of the Mujahidin who had backed
the President. Later, the MKO helped smuggle Bani-Sadr and
Massoud Ra j avi to France. While the Majlis was in the process
of impeaching Bani-Sadr, the Mujahidin distributed a phamplet
which "declared war" on the government. Shortly after this,
on 28 June, the MKO made good on its "declaration" by bombing
the IRP headquarters, killing Ayatollah Beheshti, Secretary-
General of IRP along with others. The fundamentalists struck
back immediately, as the IRGC arrested and executed scores of
MKO members. But, in spite of stepped up government attacks
on them, the leftists refrained from plunging the country into
a full scale war, preferring instead to conduct guerrilla
raids and bombings. Guards set up road blocks and fortified
mosques, IRP headquarters and IRGC headquarters because of the
frequency of these attacks. The MKO boldly drove up to the
guards' bases and roadblocks and attacked them with bombs,
submachine guns, and Molotov cocktails. Said one Iranian,
41
"It's the beginning of the second revolution." As the
violence spiraled upwards, an average of 12 guardsmen a day
were reported killed or wounded as a result of Mujahidin
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activities. A shortage of guards and trusted armed personnel
was suspected when Radio Tehran on 2 September urged volun-
teers to join the IRGC training program and called on guards
42to interrupt their "vacations" and return to active duty.
On 30 August 1981, while discussing the mounting in-
ternal security problem in Iran, President Rajai, Prime
Minister Bahonar and six others were killed by a bomb which
Massoud Keshmiri, a highly trusted security official and a
member of the Mujahidin, had planted. These two men had
been placed on the top of Bani-Sadr's list of five men whose
deaths could bring about the collapse of the Khomeini govern-
ment. The extent to which the MKO had managed to infiltrate
the upper echelons of the government, including the security
apparatus, became even more frighteningly obvious when a bomb
was discovered in Khomeini's house in Mamaran. The fuse had
been removed, and a note was attached calling for the
43Ayatollah's surrender. In order to remedy this apparent
breakdown in internal security, Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani was
appointed as Prime Minister and promised to restore internal
security. He announced changes would occur within the IRGC
and police, organizations which, because of their ineptitude,
were held responsible for allowing the June 28 bombing to
occur. In the week following the bombing, more than 200
people were executed as calls for revenge grew louder. Said
one clergyman, "One should not mourn but be decisive and
44
revenge the blood of the marytrs."
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But stepped up government attacks only served to in-
crease the MKO's resolve against the clergy. The Mujahidin
employed a suicide attack for the first time when Ayatollah
Assodollah Madani , while leading Friday prayer, was killed
by a man detonating a hand grenade. MKO members took part
in "armed demonstrations," where their armed men surrounded
demonstrators and engaged in gun battles with the IRGC.
They also enticed guardsmen into protracted fighting when
the pasdars attempted to storm Mujahidin hideouts. In one
seven hour gun battle, conducted in a six square mile area,
IRGC members who were in the process of pursuing protestors,
were trapped by Mujahidin who positioned themselves on roof-
tops and succeeded in killing 36 guardsmen.
These and other operations served to demonstrate
that, in spite of numerous purges, the MKO had managed to
maintain its command structure and organizational efficiency.
The guerrillas were commanded in Iran by Mousa Khiabani who
operated from a bunker in Tehran. Members kept in touch
through the use of walki-talkies , shortwave radios, "safe"
phone lines and, in some cases, carrier pigeons. In addition,
the organization boasted a 5,000 man intelligence network
which had penetrated the Khomeini hierarchy. In response
to the purges conducted against his organization's members,
Rajavi said: "The Resistance is prepared to pay the heaviest




5. Victory Claims over the MKO
By December 1981, the government was claiming victory
over the guerrillas, having executed some 3,000 members since
the flight of Bani-Sadr and Rajavi. According to the exiled
MKO leader, these figures did not include secret executions.
Government repression even extended into the high schools
where male and female students were subjected to extensive
searches. This was not unprovoked, as Ayatollah Pastgheib,
Khomeini's representative in Shiraj , was killed when a young
school girl detonated a bomb which was strapped to her. In
speaking of this and other incidents, Rajavi said that MKO
members were attempting to eliminate "the lower level offi-
cials responsible for torture and the executions... Although
47
when we find a chance we get someone like Pastgheib as well."
A severe blow was dealt the MKO in early February 1982,
when the IRGC, in a two day operation named "Ten Day Dawn,"
discovered the hideout of the organization's operational
commander in Tehran, Mousa Khiabani. His death, and that
of 21 other MKO members, was a serious setback, and IRGC
commander Reza'i "stressed that with the destruction of the
48
MKO Central Committee, its end was proven." During the
sweep, six MKO hideouts were overrun, thus dealing a sup-
posedly "mortal blow" to the organization. Since February,
the MKO has been subjected to a series of successful raids
by guardsmen, decimating their leadership within Iran. In
81

May, ten top members were killed, two of whom had been the
49MKO's candidates for the Parliament two years earlier.
The former President Bani-Sadr and MKO leader,
Rajavi, have established a National Resistance Council head-
quartered in Paris since their flight in July 1981. Their
strategy has been to continue to wear down the Khomeini
forces and to "break the barrier of terror" that has pre-
vented many Iranians from openly opposing Khomeini.
Rajavi understands that he cannot tackle the fundamentalists
head on as long as the Ayatollah lives. "Without the
Ayatollah," said one Western diplomat, "I shudder to think
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IV. I RAN/ IRAQ WAR
A. BACKGROUND
The Iran/Iraq war was the culmination of a decade of
smoldering tensions and clashes along the frontier. It re-
kindled a great cultural and ethnic clash which was first
determined between the Arabs and Persians in A.D. 637 with
the Arab victory at the Battle of Qaddisiyah. That battle
brought the Persian Sassanid Empire to an end, along with
its Zoroastrian religion. This was a bitter defeat for the
Persians who were contemptuous of the ethnically different
Semetic Arabs who had sprung from the desert. This age-old
hostility has now manifested itself in the current Iran/Iraq
war. President Saddam Hussein of Iraq has pointed to the
original Arab victory over the Persians and accused the
Ayatollah of attempting to reverse this historical decision
2through the current war.
A more modern explanation for the outbreak of the war
is the desire of Saddam Hussein to assume the dominant role
in the Gulf since the overthrow of the Shah and the deterior-
3
ation of the Iranian army. Central to this assumption of
power, is the control of the three strategic islands in the
Strait of Hormuz--Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs--
which Iran annexed in 1971 following the withdrawal of
43ritish colonial authorities. In the Iranian- Iraqi accord
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of 1975 which was signed in Algiers. Iraq recognized Iranian
claims to the islands, and the border region was readjusted,
giving the Iranians partial sovereignty in the Shatt al-Arab,
the estuary of the Tigris and Euphrates which comprises a
portion of the Iran- Iraq frontier at the head of the Persian
Gulf. The Shah, in turn, discontinued aid to the Iraqi Kurds,
who were involved in an insurrection against the Iraqi central
government. Because of this, the 10 year old Kurdish insur-
rection collapsed quickly.
Each country has ethnic or religious minorities which are
vulnerable to subversion by the other. Iran has non-Persian
Kurds and Arabs whom the central government has difficulty
harnassing. Both of these groups live near or on the Iraqi
border which allows Iraq to exploit easily their disaffection
with the new Iranian government. More than half of the Iraqi
population is composed of Shi'a Arabs whose grievances against
Hussein's Sunni government are easily exploited by Khomeini,
who spent 10 of his 14 years in exile in two of Shi'a Islam's
holiest shrines, Najaf and Karbala, both in Iraq. The Shi'a
Muslims tend to be poorer than the Sunnis in Iraq and have
been excluded from power since Iraq gained its independence
after World War I. Since the success of the Islamic Revolu-
tion, unrest among the Iraqi Shi'ites, especially in Najaf
and Karbala, has increased. Tensions continued to seethe
after a senior Shi'a colleague of Khomeini's, Ayatollah
Muhammad Bakr Al-Sadr, was executed in Iraq for heading the
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subversive organization known as MAl-Daawa M (The Call) . The
rift between Sunnis and Shi'ites deepened in early 1980 when
as many as 35,000 Iraqi Shi'ites were expelled from Iraq into
Iran following two assassination attempts against Baathist
7leaders in grenade attacks.
A week before the outbreak of the war, President Hussein
abrogated the 1975 pact with Iran thereby asserting Iraq's
primary in the Gulf. The agreement had given Iran the right
to share the sovereignty over the waterway with Iraq, and in
an address Hussein stated "From here on, the Shatt al-Arab is
Q
totally Iraqi and totally Arab." The Iraqi Deputy Premier,
Tareq Aziz, set forth the following Iraqi demands: 1. recog
nition of Iraq's legitimate rights and sovereignty over all
of its territories and waters; 2. agreement on conducting
neighborly relations with Iraq and other countries in the
area; 3. non-interference in the affairs of other countries
and the cessation of all aggressive actions. In addition,
he claimed the Shatt al-Arab as Iraqi territory but said it
was for the people of Khuzistan province, who are mostly
ethnic Arabs, to determine who owned the three strategic
9islands north of the Strait of Hormuz.
B. THE BEGINNING
For months before the actual war broke out, Iraq persis-
tently attacked border points in the Iranian Kermanshah and
Ham regions in an effort to wear down Iranian armor and use
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up their spare parts. Iran, on the other hand, kept its
counterattacks to a minimum. The Iraqi surprise attack came
on 22 September 1980, with the quick bombing of Mehrabad air-
port in Tehran, leaving little damage and allowing Iranian
planes to take off in hot pursuit of the attackers. Two days
before this attack, naval battles took place in the Gulf.
Reports of the sinking of Iranian and Iraqi ships, touched
off the closing of Iranian airports to civilian traffic
early on 22 September. This precautionary measure on the
part of the Iranians could have been misconstrued as prepara-
tion for attack. The Iraqi border attacks, however, were
more successful.
The Iraqi army launched its offensive from Basra and
carried it to Abadan, Khorramshahr , Ahvaz and Dezful. As
a result, Basra was subjected to heavy damage from Iranian
artillery and bombs. Dezful air base was reported destroyed
and Khorramshahr port was said to have received heavy
damage
.
At the beginning of the conflict, it was felt that if
Iraq pressed its offensive on key cities such as Abadan and
Khorramshahr, Iran's population would hold the ruling clergy
responsible for the impending national humiliation. In the
event of a defeat, the army would have borne the burden of
this disaster, which would have caused it to be more inclined
to listen to appeals for the overthrow of the religious
12
regime. Most of Iran's experienced officers had been
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purged by the revolution, there were large numbers of defec-
tions, and the lack of spare parts for U.S. made equipment,
all pointed to the fact that it did not seem possible for
1
3
Iran to conduct a full scale war for a long period of time.
The army was never confronted with the predicted defeat
since shortly after ringing Abadan, Khoramshahr, Ahvaz, and
Dezful for the final decisive push, the Iraqis let up on
their drive into Iranian territory. By 26 September they
had penetrated 35 miles into Iran. The original Iraqi designs,
according to General Khadanfar, were to restore Iraqi sover-
eignty, and to support this he stated, "We came here to make
the Iranian regime come to its senses and then we will with-
14draw as soon as they respect our sovereignty." The sub-
sequent decline in activity and statements from Baghdad
indicating a willingness to discuss peace, were seen as a
sign of weakness by Iran, and not as a signal for peace.
Hussein appeared reluctant to call for an all-out drive into
major western Iranian towns because it would mean heavy cas-
ualties and could have possibly tested his mostly Shi'ite
troops. Instead of achieving his original plan for a quick,
decisive victory, in an attempt to consolidate his power,
Hussein had reached a quick impasse.
Iraq offered a four day cease fire on 1 October to begin
on 5 October. The Iranians resisted this move in hopes of
turning the tide of the war in their favor. Two weeks into
the war, neither side was able to boast significant gains on
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the ground, while Iran relied heavily on air attacks to pre-
vent Iraqi forces from making further inroads into their
territory. The Iranian response to the cease-fire offer came
immediately when the government announced its forces were
counterattacking near the besieged city of Khorramshahr in
an attempt to "slaughter" the bogged down troops. As a
result, none of the Iraqi objectives had been achieved by
their ground forces as the Iranians made a concerted effort
to reinforce Khorramshahr and Dezful. The failure of the
Iraqis to mount a major attack against Dezful, located on
one of the main roads in Iran, and a key rail and pipeline
center to the north, was proof that they had lost their
initiative. They began to encounter a strengthening Iranian
resistance, particularly from the revolutionary guards who
proved to be cagey street fighters in cities such as
Khorramshahr where it took 24 days for the Iraqis to clear
the city of 2,500-3,000 defenders - -mostly guardsmen.
Iraq eventually widened the conflict when it launched
its first major air strike against the northern Iranian
city of Tabriz, as well as targeting Kermanshah and the
Kharg Island oil terminal in the Gulf. This escalation
followed limited Iranian successes in pushing back the
Iraqi troops from some of the border towns inside Iranian
territory. As a result, the Iranian leadership began to
prepare their people for a long conflict. Even Khomeini
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stated at a Friday prayer service, "This war is not going to
end soon," and evidence of this came with the continuation
of fierce fighting in Khorramshahr where Iranian rangers were
sent in to defend the town. They were specifically trained
to defend Iran's sovereign borders and had acquired a poor
reputation by assisting the Shah to stay in power. Their
actions in the defense of the city gained them the confidence
of the new regime and praise of the mullahs. Admitting the
role of the armed forces in keeping large areas of Iranian
territory, especially Khuzistan, from falling into Iraqi
hands caused problems for the ruling clergy who could not
allow the army to take all the credit for saving the country.
Instead, they were placing an emphasis on the IRGC's role
17in the conflict.
C. RESUMPTION OF THE OFFENSIVE
After a stall in the war's progress, Iraq began, once
again, to widen the scope of the conflict, this time with a
push to Kermanshah, representing the deepest penetration of
Iranian territory to date. However, the heaviest fighting
was reported around Abadan which underwent presistent Iraqi
artillery, fighter-bomber and gunboat bombardment and was
regarded as an important strategic objective, since its
capture would give the Iraqis complete control not only of
the huge oil refinery but also of the Shatt al-Arab, which
1
8
was one of Baghdad's original war aims. Iraq's Minister
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of Defense, General Adnan Khairallah, indicated the Iranians
had serious weaknesses in their positions and told of an
Iranian brigade which, while trying to break out of Abadan,
was encircled by his forces and destroyed. In addition, the
provincial capital, Ahwaz, was reportedly overrun by the
Iraqis. Allowing for the normal exaggerated rhetoric which
has abounded on both sides since the onset of the war, this
was an indication that the Iranian attempts to break the
Iraqi stranglehold on Khuzistan's major cities had been un-
successful, due to the superior artillery and tank forces
that confronted the defenders. Because the Iraqis thought
that the majority of the Iranian ground forces had been
drawn to the defense of Abadan, Ahwaz, and Dezful, they
stepped up their activities in the north, thinking those
defenses were relatively weak. This Iranian attempt at a
breakout against superior artillery and tanks was certainly
a desperate gamble which prompted some analysts to say that
the order must have come from a non-military leader who was
19
unfamiliar with the odds against the Iranians. This is
highly likely, since Khomeini became extremely critical of
attempts by the clergy to get involved in the conduct of
the war, and stated, "I and you and those who are not in-
formed about military matters must not interfere in military
affairs." In addition, the attempts at clerical involvement
in the running of the war were highly resented by sections
of the armed forces." This resentment ran deeper than just
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the mullahs attempting to take charge of military matters, as
reports began to show the growing rift between the army and
the IRGC. The deputy commander of the Iranian forces at
Khurramshahr , after being taken prisoner by the Iraqis, stated
that guardsmen in the city had placed themselves behind regu-
lar army troops and threatened to fire on anyone retreating.
This would lend credence to the report that, as the Iraqis
tightened their grip around the city, many regular army
21
officers and noncommissioned officers fled Ahwaz . Ayatollah
Montazeri addressed this and the problem of coordination among
the forces at a Friday prayer ceremony, "... but the respon-
sible authorities and war commanders cannot make firm deci-
sions. Or is it that--God forbid--this is deliberate? All
these (issues) should be investigated. The army commander
should, in accordance with the Imam's command, act with
greater decisiveness and should break the encirclement of
Xhuninshahr and Abadan and with lightening assault should
rid the people of Khuzistan and Kordestan of the evil of
the infidel Ba'th agents. But if they are weak and incap-
able, then they should say so candidly so that the Imam
22himself would directly make decisions."
D. MUHARRAM, 14 01 OPERATION
On 14 November 1980, the Iraqis pressed the initiative
again on the disorganized, ill-equipped Iranians and cap-
tured the town of Susangird, 50 kilometres from Ahwaz.
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Command and control within the Iranian forces, which was dis
jointed at the beginning of the war, seemed to have broken
down completely in some areas, in spite of the newly formed
Supreme Defense Council. No clear chain of command existed
as orders to the regular army followed one chain and orders
to the IRGC followed another. The battle of Susangird was
2 3to prove to be a testing ground for the newly formed SDC.
A radio report on 16 November announced that the reason for
the successful Iraqi advance on Susangird was "the lack of
artillery support for the combatants in the front line."
Military analysts interpreted this to mean criticism by the
IRGC of the regular armed forces. A victory by the Iraqis
at Susangird would have had a seriously demoralizing effect
on the Iranian army, tightened the Iraqi grip on Ahwaz, in-
creased the fundamentalist pressure on Bani-Sadr, and given
President Hussein a better bargaining position at the up-
24
coming Arab Summit meeting."
President Bani-Sadr accused the fundamentalists of creat
ing an atmosphere of insecurity in the country and asked
them to "stop the political and psychological warfare, at
least until after victory." He further blamed the funda-
mentalist Khuzestan governor, and a leading member of the
IRP, Sayed Mohammad Gharazi of "being responsible for the
fact that Khuzistan was left defenseless at the beginning
of the war" and that "Gharazi did his utmost to destroy the
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armed forces." He was also accused of playing a central role
in the purge of the upper echelons of the armed forces,
thereby leaving troops without knowledgeable and experienced
commanders which caused a disintegration of discipline within
the ranks
.
The battle for Susangird proved to be a testing ground
for the fledgling Iranian Supreme Defense Council's and
Bani-Sadr's efforts to coordinate the regular army and the
IRGC . After touring the war torn southern oil province of
Khuzistan, the Iranian President was able to reach an under-
standing v/ith the revolutionary forces, and as one Air Force
Commander stated, "The revolutionary forces now have more
faith in us." Representatives of the IRGC and the regular
armed forces began meeting regularly each evening to coordi-
nate their efforts enabling them to launch a successful
offensive against Susangird. The recapture of the city was
a test of the heretofore unchallenged organizational improve-
ments that had been recently implemented. Regular army units
were sent as reinforcements to the battlefield, and "it was
the army, not the Revolutionary Guards, which forced the
Iraqis out of Susangird," a foreign military expert back
from the front observed. He added, "This unexpected develop-
ment has boosted the morale of the armed forces, which are
winning points against the Revolutionary Guards." Coordi-
nation had improved, but the rivalry between the two forces
still existed, although heavily masked in propaganda reports.
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The army commander of an artillery battery manned by guards-
men and regular army personnel insisted in an interview with
Kayhan International that the guards obeyed army orders to
attack. Speaking of the IRGC members of his unit, he said,
"They are good fighters. Their life is not important to
them. It means nothing."
Under siege for two months, Abadan's defenders were re-
ported to have high morale and the relations between the
IRGC and army were said to be "generally good" with "minor
differences." The guards were "more disciplined than before,
27less suspicious towards their military colleagues." The
grandson of the Ayatollah (Seyyed Hossein Khomeini) told of
the improved order and discipline of the forces in Abadan
and Khorramshahr and that the "irregularities" seen in the
IRGC had been removed."
The Iraqi invasion of northwest Kurdistan province in
mid-December extended the battlefront 550 miles--the full
length of the Iran-Iraq border, from the northern tip of
the Persian Gulf north to the point where the borders of
Iraq, Iran and Turkey meet. This northern push into the
Marivan district placed the Iraqi forces within 50 miles of
Sanandaj , the second largest city in Kurdistan and site of
active insurgents. Three weeks prior to the Iraqi thrust,
there was a sharp increase in Kurdish guerrilla activity in
Sanandaj and Mehabad. The Iranian government accused Baghdad
of arming and financing the rebels in an attempt to aid them
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in their struggle for autonomy against the Islamic government.
The attack on Kurdistan was a move to put even more military
pressure on the fundamentalists to come to the negotiating
table and be more amenable to Iraqi terms. Hussein was ada-
ment in rejecting any negotiations that called for an Iraqi
withdrawal in Khuzistan, Kurdistan or the western highlands
before an "unequivocal Iranian recognition of full, active
29
Iraqi sovereignty over Shatt al-Arab."
E. THE LONG AWAITED COUNTEROFFENSIVE
Under pressure from his clerical IRP opponents who were
demanding the long-promised counterof fens ive against Baghdad,
President Bani-Sadr announced its inception in early January
1981. Ayatollah Montazeri, one of his chief detractors, spoke
out against the course of the war in a sermon in which he
related how many servicemen had complained that their military
leaders "would not allow them to advance" against the Iraqis
30
or to voice their opinions on the war.
Segments of 2 or 3 armored divisions, using Chieftain
tanks and supported by regular infantry and revolutionary
guards, began the main attack from Dezful towards Susangird
and Ahwaz. The Iraqis, however, were well prepared, since
the Iranians had not bothered to keep their plans secret
as they moved troops and supplies towards the Dezful area.
The advancing troops were met by MIG fighter-bombers and had
little air cover to support their advance. Although the
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Iranians immediately claimed great victories, the main Iraqi
positions around Ahwaz and Abadan held out. Military analysts
discounted boasts by the revolutionary army of destroying 2
Iraqi brigades, killing 500 troops and taking 2,000 prisoners,
as being "fanciful." Declaration of an Iranian victory was
deemed necessary for a "political cover-up designed for domes-
tic consumption." In fact, it was stated by one analyst that
"This week's Iranian military operations can by no stretch
32
of the imagination be described as a counteroffensive ."
Just a few days after the counteroffensive was announced,
indications appeared that the Iranians were running out of
steam and that another stalemate would settle in again. The'
Iranian Press Agency, Pars, suggested that the Iranian stra-
tegy had been simply to "weaken" the Iraqis and that the
Iranian forces had reached this objective and fighting was
diminishing. However, 3ani-Sadr promised that his forces
would continue to fight on in spite of "the high price of
holding out." 33
This offensive had few results in terms of the men and
material lost. When its first stage ended, Bani-Sadr ad-
mitted, "No offensive continues indefinitely." The increased
use of the IRGC and mobilization forces brought about a
problem of coordination at the front. This was in evidence
during a funeral service for over 100 pasdars when the mullah
giving the oration asked, "When the order for retreat is
issued why are our beloved not told and as a result encircled
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and massacred? I warn those responsible, there must be an
investigation of this for maybe there are treacherous hands
at work." Obviously, tensions between the revolutionary
guards and the army remained, both behind the lines as well
. . 34
as at the front.
F. PREPARING ANOTHER OFFENSIVE
In spite of the stalemate that settled over the conflict
soon after the Iranian January offensive, there were indica-
tions that the coming of spring would bring a new, more
aggressive Iranian push. One of the first signs of prepara-
tion for a renewed offensive was the concentration of two
divisions at Dezful, the site of Iran's most important for-
ward air base. In his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of
the Armed Forces, Bani-Sadr ordered all of his troops pulled
out of Baluchistan province. An Israeli intelligence source
reported, "The Iranians are moving a whole armored division
from Baluchistan to Khuzistan. . . Iran is transplanting this
division bit by bit, one or two tanks at a time. This opera-
tion will have been completed by the spring. Iran has enough
time to deploy and do what it wants." In addition, an armored
division stationed in the southwest in Kermanshah had been
kept from combat in preparation for its use in the spring,
while "all Iranian operations on the west front are carried
out by paratroopers and special forces." Israeli analysts
also reported that Bani-Sadr had plans to flood parts of
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Khuzistan when the offensive started. It would be done by-
opening the floodgates of the Davriaresh Dam north of Dezful
after the winter snows melted. By doing this, the Iraqi
troops would be bogged down and vulnerable to attack by both
air force and artillery bombardments.
For several reasons, Iraq's advantage had dwindled over
the course of the war, giving Iran another incentive for a
spring offensive. The Baghdad government had committed the
majority of its 12 divisions to the Gulf war, in addition to
20,000 personnel from its armed civilian groups. Because
Iraq is without a regular military reserve, it was believed
at this point to have mobilized all of its reservist potential
However, because of the size of the Iranian population, 35
million, the Islamic government still had a large reservist
pool from which to draw. The Soviet military embargo had
proven to be total and Iraq was unable to conclude any new
deals with the West and turned to Jordan and Saudi Arabia to
help in the hunt for military hardware. Iraq's stockpiled
stores near the Iraqi- Jordanian border, by this time, had
been depleted and their air defense system was almost use-
less with 80 percent of its antiaircraft missiles spent.
Finally, the winter in Khuzistan had an adverse affect of
the Iraqi soldiers, who found themselves without winter
clothing. Officers were reported losing control of their
troops "because they don't know how to operate and it happens
that Iraqi troops, by mistake shell each other."
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In the midst of these rumblings of a new Iranian offensive,
came another peace initiative, which, for the first time, was
entertained by some Iranian elements. Breaking from the pre-
vious Iranian position of refusing to negotiate with the
Iraqis as long as they occupied Iranian territory, were General
Valiollah Fallahi, Iran's military Commander, and the President,
Bani-Sadr. They provided the first public divergence from the
official view, indicating that a cease-fire was desirable. The
IRP, on the other hand, vowed to continue the fight until Iran
won. Officers of the IRGC pledged in a resolution following
a 4 day conference, in which peace negotiations were opposed,
to continue "until the aggression has been crushed and the
Iraqi people have been liberated."
As spring approached, the war had settled into a series of
artillery exchanges and Iranian guerrilla raids and was typi-
fied by the city of Susangird, twice occupied by the Iraqis.
Revolutionary guardsmen occupied the inner city, while elements
of the regular army were located outside of it. The Iraqis
were faced with having to deal with flushing out the fanatical
guardsmen from the city before reaching the regular army.
Reported one military expert in Tehran, "In many places, the
revolutionary guards serve as a buffer between the respective
regular forces... It is quite an effective arrangement, for
the Iraqis know they have to kill every man before moving
37into a place held by guards."
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Eight months into the war, the Iraqis were still on the
outskirts of Ahwaz, had surrounded Susangird on three sides,
were within 10 miles of Dezful, and had still not launched
a major offensive to capture any of these cities. Their
strategy of bombarding Iranian cities with artillery from
a safe distance without mounting a major offensive, kept
down their casualties, thus fulfilling a prime political
objective and at the same time inflicting heavy loses on
Iranians inside the cities. In addition, the Iraqis domi-
nated the eastern and northern approaches to Abadan but had
still not crossed the Bahamchir River, a move that would
have cut off the remaining Iranian supply line into the city.
Their failure to take Abadan in the initial offensive of
September 1980, made it impossible for Baghdad to lay claim
to total sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab. The cost of a
push against Abadan was considered high, since it was defended
by a division, 4,000-5,000 guardsmen, and a mechanized
brigade
.
G. THE IRANIAN PUSH
The much tauted Iranian spring offensive turned into little
more than a propaganda ploy. The Allaho-Akbar Operation, begun
on May 21, 1981, was little more than a coordinated effort to
seize the heights overlooking the town of Susangird. It was
an extension of their earlier battles whose objectives were
not major towns but the hills and ridges overlooking them.
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Once these objectives were achieved, large scale "victory"
39
claims were made by -the government. Termed strategically
important by the Iranian press, the Susangird's Allaho-Akbar
heights were "liberated" by a combined force of regular army
troops, the IRGC, arid Dr. Chamran's guerrilla forces. A com-
plete enemy armored battalion and 1 mechanized company were
reported destroyed along with boasts of large numbers of
Iraqi troops killed or captured.
It was not until September 27, the beginning of the
Saminal 'Aimeh Operation, that Iran began to make great gains
in its see-saw war with Iraq. It was able to break the year
old siege of the refinery city of Abadan and claimed it as
Iran's greatest victory thus far in the war, with 1,000 enemy
40killed and 1,700 captured. The Iranian state radio reported.
"The glorious forces of Islam today scored the greatest vic-
tory of the past year in fully lifting the siege of Abadan;
completely cleansing all areas east of the Karun River from
Darkoveyn to Abadan and opening the Abadan-Mahshar and Abadan-
Ahwaz roads." The main tactic employed by the Iranians in
this successful thrust was to hurl great numbers of guardsmen
against the Iraqi positions. The zeal exhibited by the
attackers far outmatched that of the Iraqis. In fact, the
morale of the Iraqi regular forces was so low that the rate
42
of desertion from the front was seen as "dangerously high."
Speaking of the victory, the Speaker of the Majlis,
Hojatolislam Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, said, "This
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victory could have come sooner, but Bani-Sadr hindered it,
for he was relying on pernicious elements in the Army." The
Iraqi army was reported as "broken" and the breakout from
Abadan was described as an "unprecedented victory for the
Army of Islam over the heretical forces of Saddam."
The second major Iranian autumn advance, the "Operation
Towards Quds (Jerusalem)" was launched in the area of western
Khuzestan province on November 29. It drove a wedge between
Iraq's forces in the area north and west of Susangird. In the
process of recapturing the border town of Bustan, young Baseej
volunteers walked across a minefield from the Sableh river
towards the west of Bustan. In this battle it was reported
that there were 7 pasdars for every 3 regular Iranian soldiers
The operation continued for 10 days, at which time, the
44
Iranians were able to repell several counterattacks.
The momentum of the Iranian offensive continued with
Operation Fa j r which began on December 11 in Gilan-e-Gharb
,
on the western front, with the hope of recapturing the north-
ern town of Qasr-e Shirin. The Iranian publication, Mahjubah
,
(March/Arpil 1982) boasted that the Iranians had "taken over
90 percent of the occupied lands including Shia Kuh mountain,
five kilometres from the frontiers." An example of just how
exaggerated Iranian reports had become was evidenced when
Mahjubah reported that over 20,900 Iraqi forces were killed,
as opposed to a Washington Post (12 December 1981) report of
only 1000 Iraqis killed in this operation.
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H. NEW IRANIAN ADVANCES
1982 brought a new year of Iranian successes, both large
and small, to boost the armed forces' morale. In the south-
ern region west of Ahwaz, the Daughter of the Prophet Opera-
tion followed the pattern of previous Iranian pushes - a small
gain, heralded by loud boasts of victory. Reports of hit
and run raids by the IRGC became commonplace by this time,
as the Iranian papers wrote of guerrilla operations against
45Iraqi bunkers and artillery.
The Fat'h al-Mobeen Operation, launched on March 22, was
an ambitious, well coordinated Iranian attack that xvas con-
ducted in four stages. The operation was begun rapidly and
the Deputy Commander of the 21st Division, Colonel Behruz
Suleimaja, in describing the Iranian tactics said, "we made
a lot of use of surprise." This enabled the revolutionary
forces to recapture some 8,500 square miles of territory in
southwest Iran, west of Dezful, along with taking 15,500
prisoners and killing almost 5,000 Iraqi soldiers and nearly
destroying the Iraqi Fourth Army. Employing the now familiar
tactic of using "forerunners" to clear the path of attack in
minefields, the Iranians launched their attack in the early
hours of the morning and, in many areas, were able to capture
the Iraqi trenches intact. A staff officer said, "We did it
46
with surprise-and God's help." The great victory was owed
to the "coordination and versatility between the Army, the
47
IRGC, and the Mobilization forces..." However, shortly
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after boasts such as this about the increased cooperation
within the military arose, Ayatollah Khomeini, in an Armed
Forces Day message, hinted at continuing discord within the
military and ordered commanders to purge dissident members
from their ranks. He stressed, "Victory may only be achieved
with unity. This unity must be safeguarded at all times.
If there are elements sowing discord among the military per-
4 8
sonnel, the commanders must be notified at once."
Pressing their advantage, the Iranians launched another
offensive six weeks after the successful Fat'h al-Mobeen
Operation at the end of April. The battle stretched from
the northern outskirts of Khorramshahr , still held by Iraq,
to Hosseineh in the north. Continuing to use the element of
surprise, the Iranians attacked at night and positioned them-
selves on the outskirts of Khorramshahr, enabling their
49
artillery to get within range of Iraq's oil port of Basra.
Lending credence to the Iranian victory claims, Iraq pulled
back its forces from west of Ahwaz and Susangird in an attempt
at reinforcing its units in Khorramshahr. In this "Holy
City of Jerusalem" Operation, the Iranians took two key
highway cities, Hoveizeh and Hamid. It allowed them to con-
trol two-thirds of the Ahwaz -Khorramshahr road link, enabling
them to resupply their forces as they approached the city
from the north and east. It was also reported that the
Iranians were able to penetrate the Iraqi defenses all the
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way to the Iran/Iraq border, retaking a 22 mile stretch
and effectively cutting the Iraqi forces in half.
Responding to the signal "Ya Mohammad ibn Abdullah!"
65,000 Iranian troops began the mission of recapturing
Khorrmashahr in May. With surprising ease, they were able
to surround two divisions and two brigades while the remain-
der of the 12,000 man Iraqi force fled. This lightening
victory prompted Iranian leaders to declare they would stop
at nothing, indeed, invade Iraq, in order to achieve two
objectives: 1) the downfall of Hussein and 2) the collec-
tion of war reparations.
On the heels of this victory came yet another drive, on
July 13, this one penetrating Iraq itself for the first time
in the two year old war. The Seventh Division of the IRGC,
utilizing the human wave assault which had come to typify
the Corps, spearheaded Operation Ramadan by racing through
minefields, over ditches and barbed wire in a head-on thrust
against Iraqi positions as night fell. Following them were
infantry regulars and reserves, estimated at 80,000, which
pressed on to Basra to achieve a "final solution." Iran
claimed early victory with the news that they had destroyed
two Iraqi divisions and one battalion. This operation came
as a culmination of two weeks of a mounting campaign by both
military and religious leaders to push into Iraq. The Defense
Minister, Colonel Mohammad Salimi, warned, "Despite super-
power pressure, a push into Iraqi territory has become
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inevitable." The Air Force chief, Colonel Moinpiour, called
for an all-out offensive as "the only way" to secure "final
victory." The decision to cross the border into Iraq came
in direct contradiction to earlier statements which loudly
proclaimed that the Iranians had no desire to invade Iraq.
Termed "one of the largest battles since World War II,"
Operation Ramadan slowed after the initial Iranian thrust
which extended 10 miles into Iraqi territory on the southern
front. In a pincer movement mounted from the north and south,
the Iraqis were able to cut off the advance column. Speaking
of the Iranian attack, an Iraqi Colonel said, "They came at
us like a human wave. They were running and shouting like
55hysterical people. Some of them didn't even have guns."
The second anniversary of the Iran/Iraq war found both
sides in a quandry. Iraq had lost its gains of September
1980, but Iran had been unsuccessful in its attempts to dis-
lodge Iraqi forces duge in at Basra, thus tempering their
earlier victories. To cover this setback, Hashemi Rafsanjani,
the Speaker of the Majlis, stated that the Iranian army had
advanced only "as much as it had planned." Instead, it has
been suggested that the Iranians had suffered a serious set-
back which could bring about deepening divisions among the
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It seems likely that Iran will win its war against Iraq,
eventually. Time, population, and enthusiasm are on the side
of the Iranians in this protracted war of attrition. Saddam
Hussein completely miscalculated Iran's reaction following
the initial Iraqi victories in September 1980. He believed
that Iran, weakened by the revolution and torn by internal
dissent, would quickly succumb to his more organized forces.
The occupation of Iranian territory only strengthened the
resolve of Iran's population and became a focal point for
national unity. The rebuilding of the purged Iranian
military was only hastened as a result of the war with
neighboring Iraq. From the ashes of the revolution rose a
new army, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, an Islamic
ideological army, whose battlefield fervor and maneuvering
has surprised Western analysts. The war with Iraq necessi-
tated cooperation between the regular army and the revolu-
tionary guards and it also served to strengthen the Corps
itself, from an initial membership of 6,000 to a force of
an estimated 120,000 today.
But an eventual Iranian victory will be costly to both
sides. Reports have indicated that some of the Iranian
army chiefs have expressed anxiety over poorly planned
invasion tactics of Iraq. They have felt that too great
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an emphasis was placed on the role of the revolutionary guards
and the Baseej
.
In a recent Iranian assault in the Fakah
area just inside the Iraqi border, guardsmen constituted the
bulk of the Iranian forces with a reported 12 brigades of
2,000 men each, while the regular army was represented by
only four brigades. 4 In July 1982, between 16,000 and 20,000
Iranians were reportedly killed after the Iranian command
ordered thousands of troops time after time into a narrow
triangle of desert northeast of Basra, now termed "the death
tunnel." Nonetheless, their tactics have served to terrify
their Iraqi counterparts, as they charge with no thought of
surrender or retreat. However, there are indications that,
although they are thrown into battles in suicide assaults,
recently, the guardsmen have not been as well armed or as
well prepared as in the past. Evidence of this is cited in
the enormous losses they have suffered around Iraqi positions.
Once freed of the burden of the war with Iraq, the IRGC
will have a free hand to deal with its internal enemies and
problems. Although recently, the Islamic Republic has been
able to consolidate its position against the MKO inside Iran,
resistance leaders outside of the country have begun to come
together. The different groups have formed under the title,
National Council of Resistance (NCR), whose chairman is the
former President of Iran, Abulhassan Bani-Sadr. Organiza-
tions represented are the Mujahidin, under Massoud Rajavi,
the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) led by Abdulrahman Qassemlou,
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and the National Democratic Front. In its first meeting in
Auvers-sur-Oise, France, the NCR designed a program in the
event the Khomeini government falls, whereby a provisional
government would rule Iran. With Bani-Sadr as President
and Rajavi as Premier, the provisional government would be
tasked to organize elections for a constituent and legisla-
tive assembly. The provisional government would also be
responsible for ending the war with Iraq, freeing all poli-
tical prisoners, and ending the war in Kurdestan with the
subsequent declaration of Kurdish autonomy.
Both Massoud Rajavi and Bani-Sadr contend that "Units of
resistance" are in readiness throughout the country to renew
their activities at the first sign of an easing of the war
situation. It is felt in some circles, however, that Rajavi's
Paris based organization might end up hurting his cause. Said
Rouhallah K. Ramazani of the University of Virginia, "One can't
sit in Paris and run a counterrevolution." There is also
speculation as to whether or not the Mujahidin has a large
enough base of popular support to enable it to eventually
take over the government. It has been said of the MKO , "they
can obviously disrupt and terrorize, but whether they have an
7
alternative program and leadership is far from clear."
Shrouded in their historical past x^ith an undeniable em-
phasis on religiion, the IRGC epitomizes the concept of the
"ideological army." Armed with a fanatical faith which
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glorifies martyrdom, young guardsmen have shown an incredible
eagerness to prove their faith on the battlefield, a desire
few Westerners can understand or appreciate. However, their
fervor is not confined to the warfronts . In accordance with
the IRGC constitution, the guardsmen are seeing to the exporta
tion of the Islamic Revolution in units such as the Golan
3attalion, whose job it is to orchestrate the liberation of
Jerusalem. Recently, the IRGC established a headquarters,
hospital and a sports center in Baalbek, after entering
Lebanon through Syria following the Israeli invasion of
Lebanon on 6 June 1982. On the eve of the Lebanese independ-
ence day celebration, between 300 to 500 revolutionary guards-
men stormed the main government building in Baalbek, thus
demonstrating the extent to which the influence of the
Iranian Revolution has grown throughout the Arab world and
o
the active role that the IRGC has taken in its exportation.
Perhaps this in an attempt by the Iranian government to
channel the energies and frustrations of their youth out-
ward, away from the failures of the Islamic Revolution.
Iran is in need of a Thermidor-a period of transition
from the brutalities of the Revolution to tranquility. It
was during such a period following the French Revolution
that Napoleon emerged as a leader, as did Cromwell after
9
the British Civil War. Perhaps an Iranian Thermidor will
allow the emergence of a military figure, one imbued with
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the necessary religious principles of Islam to uphold the
ideals of the Revolution, but schooled in military matters
as well. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps offers a
blending of religion and the military, a combination which
may allow this organization to capture the support of the
population following the Ayatollah's death.
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